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I CALIFORNIA Is TIVENESS CHALLENGE 
This report examines the nature of the competitiveness challenge facing 
California. analyzes its causes. strategies for meeting the 
challenge. is section provides an overview of the major findings of tne 
report. 
Ca1ifornia 1 S Declining Competitive Advantage 
California been losi its competi ve advantage in key industries 
since the early 1970s. Because industrial competitiveness is not an end in 
itself but rather means for achieving a high standard of living, this 
threatens the economic well of every Californian. In short, the'loss 
of competitiveness wi 1 reduce Cali ia's standard of living. Reversing 
this trend 11 take effort by both the private and public 
sectors. 
While loss tiveness s revealed most vividly in the 
growi ance California•s exports and imports (Figure 1) 
the imbalance only highlights a problem with much longer term, deeper root 
causes refl in Cali rnia's declini productivity advantage. 
(P ty advantage is comparison productivity in California 
relative to the United tes average.) perior productivity--measured in 
terms ue added per produc on hour--has been a key source of 
California's comparative advantage. productivity advantage is eroding 
in key industries. 
Competitiveness is the ability to produce goods and services that meet 
the test of international le simultaneously maintaining and 
expanding real incomes for resi Productivity plays a central role in 
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Aerospace--While defense spending has promoted the growth of this 
sector, California is losing its ability to compete in commercial 
aircraft. Californta•s share of commercial jet deliveries declined 
from 41.5% of the total market in 1972 to 21.1% in 1982 and 
productivity advantage in aerospace eroded from 28% in 1972 to 22% 
in 1982. The industry may thus be vulnerable to the next slowdown in 
defense spending. 
Finance--Deregulation and interstate banking have created great 
turbulence in this industry. While some institutions are doing 
poorly and others are taking advantage of the new environment, 
overall the productivity of California•s financial industry has 
lagged behind that of the rest of the nation. In 1972, California 
gross profit per employee (an equivalent measure to productivity) 
was 8.3% less than the U.S. average. By 1982, that disadvantage had 
widened to 10.2%. 
What is especially troublesome about the declining productivity 
advantage of key California industries is that California lost ground to a 
U.S. national average in productivity which has been significantly lagging 
behind productivity growth in other major industry countries. Between 1977 
and 1982, U.S. manufacturing productivity grew by only 0.6% compared to 3.4% 
in Japan, 3.0% in Frar.~e, and 2.1% in West Germany. While productivity 
growth in the United States improved in 1983, registering a 4.2% gain 
nationally, this was still behind Japan (6.2%), France (6.1%), and Germany 
( 4. 6%}. In sum, while the United States has a major productivity growth 
problem, key industries in California have been losing ground to the rest of 
the United States. 
Overall, the basic finding of the analysis can be summarized as 
follows: while California industry is still a world leader in the invention 
of new technologies and the development of new products, it is falling 
behind in the application of technologies in production and the marketing of 
these products in global markets. It is losing the race in manufacturing 
and marketing high value added products. 
A recent, vivid example of this can be found in video casette 
recorders (VCRs). While the basic technology was invented and patented by a 
California-based firm, Japanese firms have totally captured this rapidly 
growing market. No VCRs are manufactured in the United States. Over half 
of the VCRs made in Japan are built for the U.S. market. 
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There is a critical relationship between California's industrial 
competitiveness and its human resources. Competing through higher value 
added production based on advanced manufacturing will require a skilled and 
flexible workforce. Projections of California's future workforce indicate a 
higher percentage of minorities and i~nigrants who will need significant 
investments in education and training to be able to fully participate in the 
more competitive economy. Without major attention to enhancing human 
resource quality. California's ability to compete effectively in the global 
economy may be constrained. 
A competitiveness strategy for California thus consists of three basic 
elements: 
Applying technology for value-added production--using process 
technologies to achieve flexible manufacturing. Initiatives in this 
area might include establishing Centers for Manufacturing 
Competitiveness as university/industry consortium partnerships, 
forming Manufact~ring Engineering Centers of Excellence at 
universities, and encouraging the development of shared flexible 
manufacturing facilities to provide common production centers for 
severa 1 sma 11 and r.1edi urn sized firms. 
Enhancing worker productivity and adaptability--increasing the 
skills, flexibility and commitment of the work force. Initiatives 
in this area might focus on basic skills training, retraining and 
adjustment assistance, and improving labor-market matching efforts. 
Exganding markets--promoting export markets and stimulating import 
su stitution. Initiatives in this area might include export 
promotion, especially for medium-sized and small businesses. and 
regional networks to increase linkages between major producers and 
small business suppliers. 
The report suggests specific actions that can be taken to promote each 
of these areas. In summary, California needs to focus on building its 
manufacturing capacity through investments in technology and human resources 
and expanding the markets for California products. The state can target 
critical investments in the areas of technology, human resources, and market 
development while the ~rivate sector must continue its historic role of 
innovation and entrepreneurship if this strategy of competitiveness is to 
succeed. A creative partnership is needed based on a shared vision of what 
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II CAL IA PAST PRESENT 
California's Industri uti on 
An overview i des a context for the 
analysis of competi veness of key es and strategy of addressiny 
compe tiveness ems. Hi ca11y. the state•s economy has grown 
rapidly, stimulated by a series of five industrial 11 Surges" fueled by gold, 
agriculture, oil. aero croel ics. As California made tne 
transition from a resou to a technol economy, each surge 
was based on innovation entrepreneurshi willingness of the private 
sector to take of opportunities and engineer new solutions. 
From nni i a be an innovation-based economy 
ve in some key areas were 
limited--water was 1i , much of the state was desert or desert like, 
major 
and 
a eros 
~~~--~~--~~--~~--~--~ 
ifornia has had a history of 
through investments first in 
investments 
, railroads ) and later in education 
higher education). Largely because of 
ally in on and technology, California was 
of opportunities 
ics i es 
by the development of the 
and after World War II. 
Foll d II, Califo a became the ~vorld's foremost advanced 
technology economy. The state more workers employed in high technology 
manufacturi industries. more scientists and engineers, and a higher 
percen ue added in high-techno1 production than any other 
state. Both Silicon Southern lifornia have become leading 
high-technology regional usters linking major producers with suppliers and 
s ce support es. usters have provided exceptionally 
n 
good environments for entrepreneurship and innovation. By 1980, high 
technology manufacturing maintained over 3,700 business facilities with a 
total payroll of $6 billion and 400,000 workers, or 23% of the state 1 s total 
manufacturing labor force. 
The growth in high technology manufacturing has stimulated the growth 
of financial and business services in support of these growing industries. 
Together high technology manufacturing and finance have been the fastest 
9rowing industries in term of employment (Figure 3). High technology has 
also driven the growth of exports and value added in California. The three 
leading manufacturing exports in California are transportation equipment 
(largely aircraft), nonelectrical machinery (largely computers and office 
equipment) and electrical equipment (communications equipment and 
electronics components). In terms of value added, the leading industries in 
1981 were electronic equipment ($10.6 billion), transportation equipment 
($10.3 billion), and nonelectrical machinary ($8.2 billion). These were 
followed by food products ($7 billion), fabricated metals ($3.9 billion), 
printing and publishir.g ($3.6 billion) and instruments ($2.9 billion). 
The Loss of Manufacturing Capacity 
In recent years, California 1 S innovation-based advanced technology 
economy has been losing its manufacturing capacity. While the state 1 S 
industries have continued to design and develop new technology-based 
products, the manufacturing and production activities have been shifting 
away from California to other states and offshore. Hence, the state has not 
been capturing the full economic (value added and employment) benefits of 
its research. This has been due in part to the search for lower production 
costs. It also appears to ue due to a lack of innovation and investment in 
manufacturing process technologies. 
Evidence of this loss of manufacturing capacity can be found not only 
in California•s ioss of production in basic industries such as automobiles 
and steel (as described in Section V) but also in high technology 
manufacturing, the key source of growth in the past two decades. 
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Increasingly. high technology manufacturing has been leaving Silicon Valley 
as the area becomes more of a research and development center. In recent 
years, new production facilities have been built outside of Silicon Valley 
in such areas as Texas, North Carolina, and Oregon as well as offshore. On 
the other hand, major high technology companies are opening research labs in 
Silicon Valley. 
One important way to look at the problem facing California is the 
product life cyle, consisting of several key stages: basic research, applied 
* research, product development, manufacturing, and marketing. · In terms of 
the product life cycle, California has continued to be a world leader in the 
product research and product development phases but appears to be lagging in 
the manufacturing and marketing phases. The product lifecycle is breaking 
down not in the area of innovation but in the area of production. 
California is threatened on the one hand by foreign capture at the 
front end of the cycle (e.g., licensing and commercializing our basic 
research) and at the back end of the cycle (e.g., higher quality and lower 
cost foreign manufacturing combined with aggressive marketing). While the 
greatest present threat is from Japan, other countries and even other U.S. 
states are becoming an equally important threat. The Japanesse have relied 
on superior process technology rather than product technology to gain a 
competitive advantage. Between 1950 and 1978, Japan acquired over 32,000 
new technologies, mainly through licensing agreements with U.S. firms, for 
approximately $9 billion. The United States spent over $500 billion 
developing that product technology. The Japanese invested in production 
capacity (process technology), the ability to 1nanufacture technology 
products, and superior marketing; they now own major high technology markets 
in such areas as communications and semiconductors 
*The following discu~sion of the importance of the product lifecyle to 
understanding the Cal~fornia competitiveness is based on work by Regis 
14cKenna, Chairman of the Industrial Competitiveness Task Force for this 
project. See particularly his "Manufacturing Competitiveness and the 
Life-Cycle of Innovation 11 (1985). 
14 
Investment in c 
areas where Cali a is 
ed resea 
can 
opment (the 
only in the manufacturing and 
marketing phases. If on occurs outside of ~alifornia, 
the state does not capture the benefits of its invesbnent and loses a 
signficant number of jobs, especial for the middle and lower level 
production and service workers. 
One significant measure imbalance in California's 
product life cycle can be found in ative investment in basic science vs. 
technology applications in industry. This is illustrated when California is 
compared to the United States and to other U S. regions on key indicators 
for each area. On the following indicators reflecting commitment to 
research, California leads on· quali of science and engineering 
faculty, research articles per faculty member, and science and engineering 
Ph.D. graduates. However, on indicators reflecting the application of 
technology in manufacturing, as industry R&D in universities and 
industry•s own R&D, California lags the United States and especially the 
Northeast and t4idwest regions (Figure 4). Part of this can be explained by 
the high degree government-supported R&D in California, most of which is 
sponsored the Defense Department and is not focused on industria 1 needs. 
Another clear indicator of loss of manufacturing capacity can be found 
in an analysis ifornia's growth in manufacturing value added from 1977 
to 1982 For 1 manufacturi industries (including high technology and 
aerospace), the relative contribution of capital to value added declined by 
0.38% and the relative contribution of production workers declined by 9.09%. 
On the other hand. the re 1 ve contribution of nonproduction workers 
increased by 1 .37%. 1. the o of nonproduction to production 
workers increased 22.5%. While this reflects the increasing importance 
of research, design and development in California, its also clearly reflect 
the decline in importance of produc on itself in the creation of value 
added. 
For example, one semiconductor 
specializing in custom chips now fi 
only 25 are assembly workers and 
firm in Silicon Valley that is 
that a total 225 employees, 
25 are icans. The majority of 
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4 INDICATORS OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY CAPACITY 
the rest are engineers and scientists. The implications are that Silicon 
Valley is increasingly becoming an R&D and design center; new products are 
developed in Silicon Valley, then designs are sent to manufacturing 
facilities outside the state. 
Production, especially in advanced manufacturing remains critical to 
California's economic future. Its loss will mean the loss of value added 
for the state's economy and the loss of jobs. It is a fundamental 
misperception to assume that a 11 post-industria1 11 economy means a "post 
manufacturing~~ economy. While over 70% of all jobs in California are in 
services and services remain the major source of jobs in the state, the 
value added created by manufacturing pro vi des the basis for much of the 
state's service growth in such areas as finance, insurance, real estate, 
transportation, communications, and wholesale and retail trade. The 
fastest growth in services in California from 1977 to l9ti2 was in business 
services, which grew by 48%. 
Recent research at the University of California at Berkeley suggests 
that about 25% of services can be considered 11 tightly linked .. to 
manufacturing.* These include engineers and designers as well as 
maintenance personnel for production facilities because many work on a 
contract basis. Thus the estimate for the value of manufacturing, when 
increased by these tightly linked services, would account for ~pproximately 
50% of value added and 45% of employment nationally, and probably slightly 
more for California. 
Export industries act as an important driving force for the rest of the 
economy through a set of important linkages. High technology manufacturing, 
aerospace, and agriculture are the key export industries in California. 
Basic manufacturing and financial services are also important export 
industries. 
* Based on research by Michael Barrus, Codirector, Berkeley Roundtable on 
International Economics (BRIE) and member of the Industrial Competitiveness 
Task Force for this project. 
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These industries bring dollars into the state that: create jobs and income 
in those industries; create demand from a network of small and medium-sized 
suppliers in the region, and create demand for support services--both 
business services and those that are tightly linked. The income generated 
in all three areas creates demand for products and services from the core 
economy of retail trade, construction, health services, entertainment. 
While the majority of jobs are found in the small and medium size 
businesses of the core economy, the driving industries have the dynamic 
effect of bringing dollars into the state, which continues to create 
additional jobs as the dollars are spent and respent by the support 
industries and then the core economy. The total income and jobs created is 
called the multiplier. The multiplier for driving export industries is 
estimated to range from 2.0 to 3.5, depending on the sector. The higher the 
value added, the greater the additional benefit generated. Hence a dollar 
generated by the driving industries can generate up to 3.5 additional 
dollars in the economy as it circulates through the support industries and 
core economy. A dollar spent in the core economy does not have the same 
multiplier effect (the multiplier is close to 1.0, meaning a dollar spent 
here has little additional job creating impact). Hence, two important 
economic development objectives for any state are (1) increasing the amount 
of income flowing into the state by exporting goods and services that have 
large portions of value added and (2) keeping as much income flow as 
possible by increasing the number of linkages among driving and supporting 
industries in the state. 
Recent California Economic Experience 
While the California economy was hit hard by the 1981-1982 national 
recession, experiencing a net loss of manufacturing jobs and an overall 
unemployment rate of 9.7%, it has grown faster than the U.S. economy since 
then, largely as a result of the stimulus of defense spending in aerospace 
and high technology manufacturing. One-fifth of the state•s employment 
growth in 1984 was in aerospace, electronics, and defense-related 
activities. 
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In 1985, however, the competitiveness of key California industries 
began to be questioned. High technology manufacturing has been experiencing 
its worst shakeout yet as a result of overcapacity and increasing foreign 
competition. This year has seen a decline in high-technology manufacturing 
employment in Silicon Valley for the first time. Agriculture continues to 
be hurt by the effect of the overvalued dollar, which reduces exports. 
Basic manufacturing continues to undergo a significant restructuring. 
Finance is undergoing major changes as a result of deregulation and the 
movement toward interstate banking. While aerospace continues to grow as a 
result of the stimulus of defense spending, it may be affected by a leveling 
off of defense spending. This raises the fundamental issues of where the 
new sources of California economic growth will be. 
This study is being done, therefore, at a critical time in California•s 
economic hi story. The key question has become whether the state has capacity 
in manufacturing and marketing to compete in higher valued products or will 
it continue inventing new technology products that will be manufactured and 
marketed outside the state. In other words, can California capture its own 
R&D for benefit in the state through its production and marketing? The 
answer to that question will have an important impact on wealth creation and 
job generation in California in the next decade and beyond. 
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III AGRICULTURE IN CALIFORNIA 
Introduction 
Agriculture's importance in the California economy is often overlooked 
as the spotlight increasingly falls on the state's glamour industries. The 
magnitude of the state's agricultural output is especially overlooked: 
California is by far the nation's largest agricultural producer; it has 
eight of the country's top ten agriculture counties (in value of 
production). Fresno County alone has the largest agricultural production of 
any U.S. county; its output even surpasses that of 20 states. California 
agriculture is also a diverse industry producing a wide variety of 
agricultural products and having many businesses involved in food processing 
and in less direct support of the growers. 
Also overlooked is the fact that high technology and advanced consumer 
products are fast becoming as much a part of agriculture as they are a part 
of the state's aerospace and electronics industries. Thus, agriculture 
enjoys a natural fit in California•s overall economy. While the economic 
fortunes of agriculture are receding at both the state and national level, 
the fortunes of some of the more glamorous industries are also receding. In 
this context, these conclusions emerge from the following analysis: 
California agriculture has developed as a particularly strong 
industry because of the state's natural resources but also for many 
of the same reasons that California's aerospace and manufacturing 
have grown strong such as product and process innovation (e.g., the 
navel orange and the almond huller), and creativity (e.g., 
propagation of superplants by new cloning technology). 
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The industry is affected by many of the same internal and external 
forces that are affecting most California industries {e.g .• the 
strong dollar, high interest rates, foreign import barriers, stiff 
foreign competition). 
The solutions to the real and perceived problems of the agriculture 
industry fall in many of the same categories as solutions to the 
problems of other industries {especially improved marketing and 
financing). 
In short, despite the economic transformations under way in the world, 
California's agriculture industry is now and can continue to be an integral 
part of the state•s economic growth. 
Background 
California's fertile soil, temperate weather, and abundant low cost 
labor of the late 1800s and early 1900s were natural advantages on which to 
build a diversified agriculture industry. Early products included some 
fruits and vegetables; however, California's early farmers and ranchers 
concentrated mostly on producing basic commodity crops. Cattle, grains, and 
feed corn were the primary products for the industry's first century, 
although olives, dried fruit, and oranges were exported east as soon as 
train service became reliable enough for shipping perishables. 
Farmers, ranchers, and agricultural experiment stations were active 
from the late 1800s on in trying to find the best crops and strains for 
California conditions. By 1910, cotton was being tried in Palm Springs, 
breeding new types of citrus was a craze, and travelers to other lands were 
being urged to bring back seeds to try out. Between 1920 and 1930, basic 
agriculture technologies gave way to more advanced technologies based on 
irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and pest control. The state•s land grant 
colleges and agriculture extension services were established, and begin to 
institutionalize experimentation initially done by entrepreneurial 
individuals like Luther Burbank. By 1950, California was not only feeding 
much of the United States, but much of the world. 
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Overview of Current Status 
Table 1 shows that California's overall agricultural industry employment 
in 1982 stood at about 275,000. The industry contributes about $50 billion 
to the state's gross product of $500 billion. In this regard, agriculture is 
the state's number one industry. Nationally, California accounts for about 
50% of the U.S. cash receipts for fruits, nuts, and vegetables produced. 
Figure 5 highlights other specific features of California's agriculture 
industry. 
Figure S(a) shows that net farm income has dropped somewhat since 198u, 
down to about $3.3 billion in 1985. California•s share of U.S. agricultural 
income, however, was 18.7% in 1982 compared with only 9.3% as recently as 
1970. This is strong evidence that California agriculture has been 
outperforming that of other states, even during the troubled 19~0s. 
Figure S(b) shows California's farmers receiving little more for their 
products in 1984 than they did in 1979. Depressed prices in the face of 
increasing business costs is behind much, but not all, of the problem facing 
farmers. Another part of the problem is shown in Figure 5(c). Land values 
are dropping fast. This is troubling because as farmers need new 
agricultural loans, the value of their primary asset is sinking. 
The extent of foreign trade in California agricultural products is 
significant. California ranks among the top three agricultural export 
states. Of total farm acreage one out of three acres is reportedly producing 
for export markets. In 1983, more than 20% of the state's farm income was 
produced by export sales and agricultural exports totaled about $3 billion 
(8% below 1982, which in turn was down 21% from 1981 ). This downward trend 
is especially troubling at a time when the industry is increasingly relying 
on exports for overall industry growth. For example, during the high growth 
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AFFECT AGRICULTURE 
Effects 
The strong dollar has hurt agricultural exports. Foreign 
countries are aggressively competing wi U.S. products. 
System needs to respond faster to trade shifts. 
High interest rates have raised farming cost. While 
agriculture remains in recession, however, California 
is performing better than many other states due to its 
specialty crops. 
Affected by federal farm support programs, trade agreements, 
land-use and water policies, and monetary policy. 
Inappropriate federal support price and production policies 
encourage commodities at a time of diminishing demand. 
Trend away from commodity grain and beef products toward 
higher value added specialty fruit and vegetable products 
and food processing favors California. However, market 
shifts also need new responses. 
Effects 
Adoption of advanced crop and production technologies has 
been a key to California's agriculture. The continued 
adoption of new technologies (for irrigation, seeds, 
hydoponics, sensors in farm equipment), especially for 
medium and smaller operations, depends on attention to 
grower needs for new kinds of financing and new crop 
markets. 
While university trai ng for farm management has been 
excellent, there have been gaps n training for new 
management skills, especially through voc-ag 
training at community colleges. 
Serious debt problems limit ability of highly leveraged 
operations to respond to change. New types of equity and 
debt financing will help. 
Improved management throughout the system (not just growers) 
is critical as agriculture restructuring continues and new 
opportunities open for use advanced technologies. Need to 
train entrepreneurs to use technologies. 
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Changing Markets--As export markets change, commodity products are 
becoming less competitive, especi ly beef grains. There are 
clear trends toward higher-value-added products {e.g •• specialty 
fruits and vegetables), and food processing (e.g., ready-to-cook/eat 
products). 
Responding to market changes includes such things as conforming to 
common practice in selling to foreign markets (e.g., using 5-kilo 
boxes instead of 23-lb lugs to sell table grapes in Europe), meeting 
foreign regulatory demands (e.g., finding a substitute for 
prohibited wooden boxes for shipping fruit to Australia, developing 
a surer method for removing aphids from lettuce without fumigating 
to allow sales to Japan), and meeting foreign taste stanaards (e.g., 
nectarines that are both high sugar and high acid for Asia, smaller 
and more fl avorfu1 pistachios for several markets). 
Trade--The high-valued dollar and high domestic interest rates have 
hurt U.S. agriculture more than any other factor. This problem is 
particularly severe at a time when foreign countries are becoming 
more self-sufficient and, in some cases, more competitive exporters 
of their own products (e.g., Australia. Thailand). Adding further 
to this problem, some countries (e.g., Japan) are also subsidizing 
their products. Trade opportunities do exist however (e.g., South 
Korea, Thailand, Japan), but strategic and aggressive marketing is 
required. In sum, even though world food demand is increasing, many 
agriculture states are competing for fewer foreign market niches not 
being filled by the countries themselves. While California is well 
positioned for improvements in foreign trade situations {because of 
past successes, a good understanding of new economic realities, and 
its western-most location), for California to be ultimately 
successful, the currently high-valued dollar must conform more with 
the true value of other market currencies and interest rates must 
moderate. However, market shares lost to other countries because of 
the high dollar are unlikely to be regained fully. {The offsetting 
factor is that Ca'l ifornia is able to grow many kinas of crops so 
that, given enough market information for both growers and 
middlemen, lost markets can be replaced by new ones.) 
Internal Factors 
These internal factors are significant in California: 
Technology--Agriculture is going through an explosive adaptation to 
key advanced technologies (e.g., computers, biotechnologies). 
Opportunities still exist, however, for continuous adaptation to 
existing technologies and development of new technologies (e.g., for 
irrigation management, seed treatment, managing pesticide use, 
advanced mechanization like sensors and robotics in farm 
equipment). While California•s large operators may be leading the 
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Human Resources--California' specialty crops are especially 
sensitive to the need for timely harvesting. Advanced mechanization 
is eliminating some, but not a11 need for semiskilled farm labor. 
While the cost of farm labor is climbing, so is productivity. The 
real need is new types of managerial training, (not in how to do 
the job but in how to use the information that is becoming 
available) especi 1y in the area of marketing. New voc-ag 
curricula at higher educational levels. especially in California's 
community colleges would help growers learn about new financing 
possibilities, new crops, new markets and new marketing techniques. 
The state 1 s land grant and community colleges need to establish 
stronger relationships with the industry--particularly, shippers, 
wholesalers, stributors, who are often left out--and jointly 
develop opportunities more applied research and for more 
programs in advanced cultural marketing for grower coops as well 
as vertically integra corporate farms and independent middlemen 
Using California's educational system to disseminate information 
might so foster the development of new entrepreneurial ventures, 
among packers as well as growers. 
Financial Capital--Nationally, large operators and some small 
operators are reiatively debt-free, but there are very serious 
problems wi middle-sized. mostly family-run operations too small to 
have competi ve economies of scale and too large to remain debt-free 
in time of major recession. In California, however, the problems are 
reportedly large operators that took on heavy debt in the 
expansionary 1 • Their problems also include depreciating assets 
and, in serious cases, lenders now unable to continue carrying the 
debt. There is a compelling need to identify new ways to share 
financial sk. le there are some signs of urban capital flowing 
to meet rural , major initiatives are still needed to support new 
equity and debt nancing methods. Falling land values are a serious 
problem, however, as equity and collateral diminish. 
Management--Management that effective responses to market 
changes may be the most significant area of opportunity. World demand 
patterns are changing--old markets are closing (e.g., feed 
commodi es) and new ones are opening (e.g., for new processed food 
products). Both growers and middlemen/processors need new \'lays of 
responding those changes. In some cases direct marketing of 
specialized can be more successful than traditional marketing 
approaches. ifornia agriculture needs to undertake more 
information shari through workshops in specific products. Finally, 
California 1 s educational institutions must provide new academic 
programs for development of the industry's marketing skills. 
Policy view--Traditionally, government has attended mainly to 
problems of growers without seeing agri cu1 ture as a system. Thus, 
technological improvements and applied research focused on any 
portion of the system beyond the grower tend to receive less pub1 ic 
sector attention. This often leaves the grower unable to change 
because problems further on or earlier in the system have not been 
addressed. 
From the brief summary above, it is clear that California's agriculture 
industry is affected by many of the same external and internal factors that 
are affecting other industries in the state. But if one set of factors can 
be said to be dominating the industry today it would be the following: 
increasingly stiff foreign competition is developing at the same time that 
the dollar is unusually strong, interest rates are high, and trade barriers 
are developing (e.g., Japan has import quotas on oranges). California, it 
will be argued, competes very well in domestic markets. The problem then is 
California's decreasing competitiveness in foreign markets at a time when 
California is increasingly an agricultural exporter. 
Competitive Assessment 
Domestic Competition--Products 
Table 3 lists 29 major agricultural products for which California's 
production currently leads the nation. Ca1ifornia 1 S top ten products have 
been capturing the same or a greater share of U.S. production since 198U. 
California dominates all other agricultural states in high value 
Qroducts. Where Wyoming is strong in sheep and wool production, and Iowa in 
corn and other grains, these are relatively low value products in which U.S. 
agriculture is losing (or has lost) its competitive edge overall with 
foreign countries. California, always strong in basic agricultural 
commodities, is increasingly moving "up-scale." Almonds, pistachios, 
artichokes, asparagus, kiwifruit, and the like bring premium prices in 
rapidly growing specialty markets. The advantage is not only that these 
products bring high prices, but that these crops can be grown in only a few 
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Table 3 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN WHICH CALIFORNIA LEADS THE NATION 
California Share of 
U.S. Production (Percent) 
CommoditX: 1983 1980 
Prunes 100.0% 100.0% 
Pistachios 100.0 95.0 
Kiwifruit 100.0 NA 
Almonds 99.9 95.0 
Olives 99.9 95.0 
Pomegranates 99.9 95.0 
Figs 99.9 65.0 
Dates 99.8 65.0 
Walnuts 99.0 95.0 
Nectarines 97.2 95.0 
Apricots 95.7 96.6 
Broccoli 89.9 95.3 
Grapes 88.9 91.6 
Plums 88.4 100.0 
Avocados 95.3 73.3 
Processing Tomatoes 84.9 NA 
Lemons 79.8 NA 
Safflower 75.0 NA 
Cauliflower 72.1 74.8 
Honeydew Melons 71.7 71.0 
Strawberries 70.0 75.3 
Lettuce 69.4 74.4 
Celery 68.0 NA 
Peaches 58.9 66.4 
Carrots 51.3 53.0 
Onions 30.1 78.4 
Alfalfa Seed 25.4 39.7 
Nursery Products 24.6 NA 
Eggs 12.0 NA 
California also leads the nation in the following commodities, although 
information is not available for their shares of U.S. production: 
artichokes, asparagus, Brussels sprouts, cantaloupes, casaba melons, 
Crenshaw melons, cut flowers, garlic, green lima beans, jojoba, Ladino 
clover seed, fresh market mushrooms, oriental vegetables, Bartlett pears, 
Persian melons, persimmons, potted plants, and spinach. 
Source: Security Pacific National Bank 
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areas in the world so that California•s competition is limited. 
Nevertheless, specialty products are import sensitive and many developing 
countries are producing one or more to earn foreign currency. Therefore, 
California cannot afford to lose any more of its edge. 
Domestic Competition--Processing 
California's agriculture industry is not limited to specialty crops 
characterized by high intrinsic value. The state also has a growing food 
processing industry that is adding value to basic products like beef, 
chicken, fruit, and vegetables. Meeting new demands for new, fast 
preprocessed, precooked, prepackaged, 11 home-cooked" meals, California's food 
processors are responding by, for example: breading, flavoring, and cooking 
chicken parts; slicing and cooking french fried potatoes and onion rings; 
and packaging all kinds of food products for today's microwave cooking. 
At the same time, the state's traditional food processing industry is 
not faring well. For example, ten fruit processing operations in California 
have closed since 1981; exports of canned peaches, pears, and fruit cocktail 
have declined, and imports have grown significantly. According to the 
Agricultural Council of California, imported canned peaches are $2 a case 
cheaper on the East Coast than California canned peaches. 
Shipping technology is an area in which public sector R&D has been 
scant. However, the deve 1 opment of trade with southern hemisphere nations 
could provide small but growing markets for California stone fruit, nuts, 
and salad vegetables given methods of packing that would assure arrival in 
good condition. 
While university research aimed at pro vi ding a 1 ong-shel f-1 ife product 
in a lighter, easier to transport form (while retaining flavor) might make 
California processed fruits coMpetitive once again, the food processing 
industry is changing. Success in the long run is more likely in innovative 
new processed food products than in new methods of processing traditional 
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products. Industry, university and government policy should be directed as 
both new products and products for which there are signs of new demand, and 
efforts should be made to leverage public financial support of the industry 
(e.g., basic and applied research) to attract new private foreign and 
domestic invesonents. 
Foreign Competition 
California is a significant producer of cotton, rice, almonds, oranges, 
and grapes, with much of the production destined for foreign markets. 
Exports of these five crops comprise 56% of all exports. Table 4 summarizes 
California's comparative advantages, disadvantages, how these five crops are 
faring now in foreign markets. and what future they face. 
While export crops are being hurt by the high-valued dollar, each is 
also being affected (although differently} by other factors. For example, 
cotton exports are increasingly threatened as end-use markets for cotton are 
leaving the United States for Far East locations. Many countries have 
developed vertical integration in cotton; while California grows the raw 
material, there is little textile production in the state. Shipping costs 
offset much of the quality advantage of the California product. This fact, 
coupled with an increase in worldwide cotton acreage, is likely to cause 
cotton exports to decline over the next few years. One big California 
cotton co-op is predicting that 10% to 20% of the state's cotton growers may 
go out of business next year. Whatever the actual outcome, it seems likely 
that next year will see a permanent cut in cotton production. 
Almonds are a specialty crop for which California faces competition 
from i~diterranean countries, far from growing markets in Southeast Asia. 
Domestic almond prices have dropped from their 1979 peak of $1.90 lb to 
$1.20 or less. A 2-year oversupply of almonds is exacerbating the already 
serious problem. Oranges have been affected by EEC arrangements and by 
quotas imposed by Japan to protect their filandarin orange industry which 
competes domestically and in Southeast Asian markets. The outlook is for a 
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Table~ 
AAJOR CAlifORNIA CROPS IN 
fOREIGN COMPETITION 
1984 
Percent Exported Expected Prhtary Prtaary C0111peti ti ve C0111petlthe (Value of Total Value) Ex~rt Trend Mllrkets C!!!ee t 1 tor Advanta:ze Dlsadvanta:ze ___ 
Cotton 70-800: Down Japan, other PRC, Russia High quality product End-use markets leaving 
Pacific Ri111, U.S., over-valued dollar, 
Russia, PRC competitors improving 
production quality, 
worldwide cotton acreage 
increasing. 
Almonds 50-60 Down W. Genaany, Spain, Italy Ideal growing conditions, Over-valued dollar, Spain 
Japan, Taiwan, high quality product, expect admittance into EEC 
S. Korea product variety. could hurt California 
producers.. 
Oranges 30 Flat Worldwide, Mediterranean High quality product, Over-valued dollar, Japan 
Japan, other countries ideal growing conditions, has imposed trade barriers. 
Pad fie Rim seasonal differences 
w make California oranges 
0"> attractive in European 
markets, juice processors 
in Cal fforn1a. 
Grapes, 12-15 Down Hong Kong, G1-eece, Turkey, Ideal growing conditions Over-valued dollar, trade 
Raisins, Singapore Australia barriers, EEC very 
Table Wfne aggressive and surplus 
very large. 
Rice 40-45 Flat Developing Thailand, Ideal growing conditions Over-valued dollar, high 
Pacific Rim Japan, Korea labor costs. 
mostly flat orange export market over the next few years. (Brazilian orange 
juice competes mostly in eastern U.S. markets. and mostly with juice from 
F1orida.) 
California's grapes, raisins, and table wines increasingly compete with 
products from Mediterranean countries and from Australia. The European 
Common Market is also increasingly competitive (some observers speak of the 
EEC "wine lake"), so that the outlook is for modest declines. 
Finally, California rice is facing increasingly stiff competition, 
especially from Thailand. It is likely that the state will lose export 
market share through the end of the century. 
Summary of Major Inter~ational Trade Problems 
Confronting California Agriculture 
These appear to be the major trade problems: 
Overvalued Dollar--Raises cost to foreign countries that import U.S. 
agricultural products, thus, limits demand. Lowers cost to U.S. 
buyers of foreign food products, thus 1 imi ti ng domestic demand for 
domestic products. California•s dollar problem is more severe for 
European currencies and markets than for Asian currencies and 
markets. 
Trade Barriers--California is facing both tariff barriers 
(restrictive Japanese custom duties on citrus fruits) and nontariff 
barriers (kiwifruit and walnut restrictions because of fumigants and 
packaging employed by California producers). 
Subsidies and Dumring--While the United States is attempting to 
control this prob em through GATT negotiations, it is doing so 
industry by industry, and with little hope of success. Agriculture 
is not a priority at this time (the California fig industry faces 
subsidized dried fig imports duty free at a price below domestic 
costs of production). 
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Overview 
As with U.S. agriculture, California's agriculture industry is troubled 
by macro factors that are affecting many industries today. But what is 
particularly important are the trends in foreign trade. An increasing 
foreign ability to compete in agricultural production for home use and for 
export coupled with today•s overvalued dollar are hurting California 
agriculture in ways not felt before. While California is blessed with ideal 
growing conditions for many crops, higher quality products, and higher 
overall yields, foreign competitors have the advantage of growing domestic 
markets, less expensive labor, more government support, and direct trade 
pro teet ion. 
The difficult question is whether California•s inherent strengths 
(geography, weather) alone can stem the export decline. As the dollar 
weakens (as expected in late 1985 and 1986), exports might be expected to 
rise; however, in many cases Third World countries will keep the markets 
they gained while the dollar was high. The advantages held by foreign 
countries may well outweigh California 1 S advantages between now and the turn 
of the century. Furthermore protectionist threats against U.S. products are 
widespread today. It is possible that U.S. countermeasures to foreign 
competitive practices (such as quotas or high import duties) will result in 
foreign retaliation. If Pacific countries chose to retaliate by closing 
their markets to U.S. goods (as was the experience when the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act of 1930 became law), California agriculture would be hurt. There 
is also the threat that as some of the Pacific nations (especially Japan, 
Korea, and Thailand) move to even more advanced production technologies, 
these countries can begin to move their products into California's currently 
captive export markets, permanently damaging California agriculture. State 
1 eaders must be aware of these threats and be a 1 ert to the fact that 
California's specialty crops are increasingly sensitive to foreign 
competition. 
Will California's agricultural industry follow the path of California 
steel, automobile and electronic industries? The answer lies in the extent 
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to which California 
techno 1 ogy, new 
revisits the list 
discussed earlier. 
ture becomes even more aggressive users of 
new marketing, and advanced technology. Table 5 
and internal factors affecting agriculture 
For each factor, Table 5 shows whether California is at 
an advantage, a disadvantage, or is about at parity with the major foreign 
competition. The table shows that the state•s Ag industry is at a distinct 
disadvantge in terms of federal policy support (trade and fiscal policies 
are hurting the industry) and high cost of capital (real interest rates are 
causing problems for debt-laden operators). California is at an advantage 
in terms of changing U.S. markets (the move to special high-value added 
products by today 1 s "fashion eaters 11 and the newly diet-conscious consumer 
is helping California), applications of product and process technology 
(California is leading the world in labor-saving technology), new marketing 
aproaches. and management (California is strong but there is still room for 
improvement in accessing and using new types of information). 
Table 5 can help serve as a guide for designing public policy, 
education, and lobbying remedies for those areas where a significant 
disadvantage exists and for developing further public policy support to 
those areas characterized by parity or a si gni fi cant advantage. 
At the same time, ifornia could benefit even further by looking at 
agriculture as a of systems that include packers and shippers, 
suppliers, lenders. and wholesalers, not just growers. In some cases, 
advances need to be made in other parts of the system to allow growers to 
1.1ake adequate responses to market changes. 
Future Prospects 
There are already some signs that segments of California's agriculture 
industry are at the bottom of a deep cycle and are recovering. The Almond 
Growers Exchange, for example, recently reported a 40% increase in 1985 
exports and an 18% rise in domestic shipments. Much of this improvement 
comes from innovative products such as almond butter (from 40,000 pounds in 
1981 to 3 million pounds in 1985). 
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Table 5 
KEY CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
vs 
MAJOR FOREIGN CO~IPETITION 
Disadvantage Advantage 
Major iHnor Parity t~inor i4ajor 
External Factors 
Federal Policy 
Changing t4arkets 
Trade Pol i ci es 
Internal Factors 
Technology 
Process 
Product 
Human Resources 
-
-
-
Quality 111111 
Quantity -
Cost of Capital 111111 
~1anagement/Marketi ng -
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These improvements, while encouraging, are not universal across all 
products. Some products 1 ike cotton and rice may be permanently damaged by 
foreign advances. Where California has unique comparative advantages, such 
as ideal growing conditions (e.g., kiwifruit, nuts), the now diminishing 
dollar value, and moderating interest rates should improve economic 
performance. Mobilizing political pressure against subsidies and dumping 
practices (and threats of retaliation) may reduce these competitive 
pressures~ but because foreign relations are so complex and other U.S. 
interests may be involved (e.g., the need for U.S. banks to have Third World 
loans repaid) such mobilization n~y not be feasible in all cases. 
Overall, ,while there are positive signs, foreign countries are becoming 
more self sufficient and able to compete effectively in international 
agriculture trade. California•s edge in high value, specialized products is 
likely to diminish slowly over the next 10 to 15 years. To keep the 
industry•s overall economic performances at 1980 to 1985 average levels, or 
better, will require research, and new products and processes only now on 
the horizon. Aggressive and strategic marketing must accompany both new 
breakthroughs and maintaining sales of today•s products. California can 
maintain a viable agriculture industry by building on its most obvious 
comparative advantage--the power of technology, creativity, and innovation. 
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IV HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING IN CALIFORNIA 
Introduction 
High technology manufacturing in California has been an engine of 
growth in employment and output in California 
War II, employment in high tech manufacturing 
from 18,355 in 1947 to over 350,000 in 1982. 
manufacturing. Since World 
has increased nineteenfold--
The most rapid growth has 
occurred in communications, electronics, computers and office machinery, and 
instruments. 
California's success with high technology manufacturing and the growth 
of such high technology regions as Silicon Valley have made California the 
envy of the world. Today, however, there appears to be a slowdown in 
leading high tech sectors in California because of foreign competition, 
overcapacity, and decentralizatlon of the industry to other regions and 
coun es. 
California could become the "electronic rustbelt" of the 1990s unless 
its electronic, computer, and communications industries are able to remain 
at the forefront of new product and process innovation and development. The 
question facing these sectors is how they can maintain their competitive 
edge. Even if they find a way, however, the "electronic" industrial 
revol on is now well advanced and many of the current electronics 
industries are becoming mature. California cannot stake its future on the 
sources of past economic success. Instead, it should seek continuous 
innovation and adaptation to new market opportunities in advanced 
technologies. 
43 
The primary key to ifornia • s c lies in i ability to 
remain a seedbed innovation across many sti , emerging. 
to-be-seen gh 
these areas. To do so. 
industries and to retain manufacturing capacity in 
the state must revitalize its ability to support 
advances in technology, entrepreneurship, and human and capital resources. 
It also needs to stimulate the emergence of tomorrow's high technology 
industries which will ultimately be the source of new jobs and opportunities 
in California in the 1990s and beyond. 
The Emergence of California's High Tech Industrt 
For California, World War II marked the turning point in the state's 
transition from a resource-based economY to one based on advanced 
technology. What spearheaded the drive to an advanced technology economy 
was the phenomenal growth of increasingly sophisticated defense industries. 
After the war, a number of major firms--Douglas, Northrop, Hughes--that had 
supplied the war effort with aircraft and other advanced technology systems 
from California continued to invent new technoloqies and develop ne\'1 
products such as jets, missiles, radar, and lasers. The expansion of these 
firms continued throuqh the Korean War. Between 1950 and 1954, military 
prime contracts awarded to California firms totaled nearly $13 billion or 
about 14% of an awards nationwide. In 1957, the launching of Sputnik 
expanded and broadened the significance of nonmilitary space development. 
Again, California was able to lead the way. In that year, employment in 
aerospace topped 270,000. 
Throughout this period, defense spending ped to promote advanced 
technology development, especially in the aerospace industry. At the same 
time, the application of these technologies to commercial use was beginning 
to increase. which led the way to the next phase of California's industrial 
revolution. 
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In a transi on dominance by 
aerospace i a more versifi manufacturing sector, which began to serve 
effectively commercial markets. While aerospace still accounted for over 
34% of a11 manufacturing employment in 1965, the advanced technology 
manufacturing base was broadening. 
During the 1950s, a new nucleus of high technology activity was forming 
in what was to become known as Silicon Valley. Several electronics firms, 
such as Hewlett-Packard and Varian, had a 1 ready been 1 aunched in Santa Clara 
County by engineers from Stanford University. However, it was not until the 
mid-1950s when William Shockley, inventor of the transistor, and other 
semiconductor pioneers came to Palo Alto that a critical mass of electronic 
engineers and entrepreneurs collected in the area. The age of the 
transistor and semiconductor arrived swiftly thereafter. In addition to the 
continuing military market, growing number of transistor firms 
discovered a consumer market in the mid-1950s, first for portable radios and 
hearing aids~ and then for computers. The computer market, which was 
expanding rapidly, entered the Silicon Valley when 1Bt4 opened a research and 
manufacturing plant in San Jose in 1956. 
major change in the 1960s was the commercial application of the 
i ci t--a central element in microelectronics. The first 
integrated rcuit was put into production in 1960 by Fairchild for NASA and 
a variety 
pu 
1965, 
of CO!l1l1erci al equipment manufacturers. 1 n 1962, the government 
100% of the integrated circuits produced in the United States. In 
the 
use was compl 
by government. 
purchased 55% and by 1969 it was purchasing only 36%. 
the 1960s, the transition from military to commercial 
1978, only 10% of integrated circuits were purchased 
The invention in 1969 the computer-on-a-chip known as the 
c the next round of growth in commercially driven 
microel ics. Between 1972 and 1982, the 30 or so chipmaking firms in 
Silicon 11 grew to over 3,000 assorted firms who were by then offering a 
wide varl ety of high technology products and services for conwerci al 
markets--nearly 1 based on the integrated circuit the c rocessor. 
key point is that while defense procurement an important role in 
the birth of Silicon lley, it was the transi on to commerci . markets in 
the 1960s and 1970s that sustained its growth. 
High Technology Industry in California Todal 
High technology manufacturing in California has been the most dynamic 
and vital segment of the state's economy. In 1972, only 14.8% of 
manufacturing employment was in high tech manufacturing (including computers 
and office machinery, electronic components, communications equipment, 
instruments, and drugs). By 1982, nearly one-fourth of all manufacturing 
employment in the state was in high tech manufacturing. Table 6 shows the 
growth in high tech manufacturing employment and value added from 1947 to 
1982. 
The growth of high technology industry has occurred in rather 
specialized locations. i~ost high technology firms, early in their product 
life cycle, have tended to cluster because of communication and innovation 
economies. In California, two major high technology clusters have developed 
in the Santa Clara Valley and one in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. A 
high proportion of California's high tech manufacturing is concentrated in 
these two agglomerations. 
High tech manufacturing is likely to remain important to ifornia 
economy, particularly in electronics and solid state technology. These 
technologies will also be central to the future modernization and survival 
of older sectors, perhaps giving them a new lease on life in the face of 
foreign competition wi low-cost labor. 
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Table 6 
CAllFORNIA EMPLOYMENT AND REAL VALUE ADDED IN HIGH TECH MANUFACTURING, 
1963-1982 
Emelo,lment (in thousands) 
Sector 1963 1967 1972 1977 1982 
Drugs 3.7 n.a. 8.7 11.8 14.9 
Computers n.a. n.a. 43.1 63.4 112.7 
Communications 96.7 99 75.6 89.5 137.3 
Electronics 45.8 59.4 53.2 85.2 135 1 
Instruments 22. 33.3 48.1 69 91.8 
Total n.a. n.a. 228.7 318.9 491.8 
Real Value Added (in millions of 1972 dollars) 
Sector 1963 1967 1972 1977 , 982 
Drugs 62.1 n.a. 245.7 343.2 451.9 
Computers n.a. n.a. 932.6 1,644.8 2,879.5 
Communica ons 1,627.5 1 • 914. 5 1,535.3 2,033.3 3,324.4 
Electronics 648.6 886.7 910.9 1,699.5 3,013.6 
Instrumen 362.1 600.4 927.3 1 '384. 7 2,093.4 
tal n.a. n.a. 4,552.0 7,1Uti.5 11 '762. 9 
Source: U.S. Cens~s of Manufactures, 1963-1982. 
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Factors Affecting Development of High Technology 
Manufacturing in California 
Both external and internal factors shape the opportunities for high 
technology manufacture in California. 
Externa 1 Factors 
While the high value of the dollar hurt exports of high technology 
manufacturing, the major external factor affecting the industry was a 
slowdown in world dema~d beginning in 1984. This was especially severe for 
semiconductors: world demand actually dropped by 10.4% in the fourth quarter 
of 1984. The rapid growth in demand for high techno.logy products in 1983 
resulted in a build up of excess capacity in the high technology industries 
which was not needed when purchases slowed down in late 1984 and 1985. 
Major purchasers of high technology equipment slowed down their procurement 
of new equipment in 1984 as they made inventory adjustments. This resulted 
in slowdown of production and layoffs in many high technology firms. At the 
same time, the Japanese began to gain an increasing share of the 
semiconductor market. Furthermore, the Japenese became important in markets 
once dominated by U.S. high technology manufacturers, especially in 
communications equipment, instruments, and computers. These developments 
appear to be cyclical in nature and should be corrected as demand increases 
again. 
The strongest external threat is the degree to which foreign 
competitors are penetrating world markets and reducing U.S. market share. 
The high value of the dollar has contributed to this problem. So have 
focused Japanese efforts to penetrate specific markets in semiconductors, 
communications, and instruments. However, external factors do not account 
for all of the competitiveness threat. U.S. manufacturers must continue to 
innovate in producing higher value added, quality products that meet 
changing world demand. Thus we must examine factors critical to 
competitiveness within the internal control of the industry itself. 
48 
Beyond external factors, a of critical factors internal to high 
technology manufactu ng have a critical impact on future development. In 
technology, while California remains the leader in the product innovation, 
it is losing its lead in manufacturing process innovation, reflected in the 
decline of Ca1ifornia 1 s productivity advantage in critical industries such 
as computers and office equipment Shortages of key technical personnel and 
engineers are cal problems in production improvements. The higher cost 
of capital in the ted States than in Japan places high technology 
manufacturers at a comparative disadvantage in new capital investment. 
Thus, several key internal factors are creating problems for California high 
technology industries and their ability to produce competitively using new 
process/manufacturing technol es. 
The Case of Semiconductors 
The semiconductor industry provides a specific illustration of the 
importance of 
e 7 swrmari zes 
i . ) 
ogy 
semiconductors 
external and internal threats to competitiveness. 
internal and external factors affecting this 
rs are the basic building blocks for advanced 
complex electronic circuitry possible with 
possi e the development of advanced computers, 
telecommunications equipment, a wide range of consumer electronics products, 
industrial 11 Smart weapons. 11 Manufacturing and service industries 
are increa electronics ntensive, and semiconductors are the source of 
a rising share ue of such products as automobiles and 
manufacturing equipment. 
If California the United States fall behind Japan in semiconductor 
technology, surely the technological gap would extend to other fields. In 
industrial machinery, for example, there is increasing use of 
microprocessors and other electronic components. Were Japan to dominate 
technological advances in semiconductors. Japanese robotics firms, 
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External 
Trade 
Business 
Cycle 
Federal 
Policies 
Changing 
Markets 
Internal 
Technology 
Human 
Resources 
Financial 
Capital 
Management 
TABLE 7 
FORCES AFFECTING SEMICONDUCTORS 
Concerns about barriers to Japanese markets and Japanese 
"dumping 11 chips in American markets. (Japanese- share of 
U.S.market increased from 7% in 1980 to 17.4 %in 1984, while 
U.S. share of Japanese market was constant at 11.9%.) 
Slowdown in world demand began in third quarter of 1984, 
creating a downturn in the industry. 
Extension of R&D tax credit important for technological 
innovation. Concerns about tax reform proposal concerning 
depreciation and tax treatment of international operations. 
New uses for semiconductors critical for future growth 
especially in automated manufacturing and communications. 
Process technology improvement is critical for rapid changes 
in product cycle and value-added production. 
Shortages of engineers and key technical personnel. 
Quality improvements linked to human capital investment. 
Cost of capital much higher than in Japan. Debt to equity 
ratio much higher in Japan. 
Innovative management of technology is key; so is effective 
human resources management. 
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industri machine , and d be the first to benefit 
from innovat1ons in desi and application. 
Overall. the trends do not look favorable. Despite the impressive 
performance of the U.S. semiconductor industry in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. 
producers of semiconductors have been outperformed by the Japanese. 
Japanese exports of total semiconductors surpassed U.S. exports to Japan in 
1977. Integrated circuit imports from Japan surpassed exports to Japan in 
1978. U.S. imports of metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) integrated circuits 
from Japan surpassed U.S. exports in 1979. Japanese semiconductor makers 
increased their share of the U.S. market from 7% in 1980 to 17.4% in 1984, 
while the U.S. share of the Japanese market stagnated at 11.9%. 
It is so expected that Japanese demand for semiconductors will 
continue to grow more rapidly than American demand over the rest of this 
decade. By the early 1990s, Japan could be the largest semiconductor market 
in the world. In 1979, Japan•s market for semiconductors \'las only about a 
third of the size U.S. market. 
This year, many chipmakers in the Silicon Valley continue to suffer 
from extremely stiff international competition. The semiconductor industry 
is with a ng erosion of its competitive position. Many 
companies are closing production facilities in California or are shifting 
production offshore while other firms are building new, highly automated 
facilities within California. The most successful California semiconductor 
rms are those that have been e to remain in the forefront of advanced 
ogy. product life cycle in this industry averages 3-5 years. 
Major semiconductor rms, faced with a rapid decline in the price paid 
for commmodi random access memory (RAM) chips, have been attempting to 
meet the challenge of competition by shifting the production of much more 
complex customi i One major California manufacturer, Intel, 
recently announced it was withdrawing a1togther from the production of 
commodity RAlvf chips and concentrating on high value added chips (e.g., logic 
chips and erasable-programmable read-only memory, or EPROM, chips). 
The Japanese have been more competitive in manufacturing chips than 
California firms in part because they a lower cost of capital in 
Japan. This means that Japanese firms have been e to make investments in 
R&D and in new capacity at much higher levels than California firms and thus 
can overcome the rapid obsolescence of semiconductor products and production 
technologies. The major difference is that Japanese companies raise their 
money from banks while U.S. firms raise money on the stock market which 
emphasizes short-term profitability. Consequently, Japanese capital 
investment has averaged 27.6% of sales since 1980, against U.S. investment 
at on 1 y 17. 4%. 
The U.S. semiconductor industry must find a way to keep profits high in 
order to raise money. Many industry leaders maintain that the only way they 
wili be able to successfully compete in the future is to penetrate the 
Japanese market. And to do so, they need U.S. government pressure on 
trading relationships with Japan. At the same time. semiconductor firms 
must continue to concentrate on improvements in both product technology and 
process manufacturing to capture increasing shares of the higher value, 
customized part of markets. This emphasis on both trade and 
higher-value-added production is remarkably similar to the key ingredients 
for agricultural competitiveness. 
Competitive Assessment 
How competitive California's high technology manufacturing has been is 
based on how we 11 manufacturers have performed in the domestic and 
international markets. The competitiveness of California's high tech 
industry relative to that of other states can be measured using three 
methods. First, simple measures of California's share of U.S. employment 
and value added in high tech manufacturing and the relative California U.S. 
growth rates in value added by high tech manufacturing reflect the 
comparative advantages of plant location in California. Second, 
productivity in Ca1ifornia 1 s high tech manufacturi industries can be 
compared with that for the nation as a whole. Obviously, California's 
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productivity advantages in high tech manufacturing help to explain the 
overall growth of the industry in California. Third, the export performance 
of high tech industry in California can be compared with that of the nation. 
In the international economy, California's high tech competitiveness 
can be inferred by examining the relative share of U.S. high tech 
manufacturing exports. 
California's High-Tech Competitiveness in U.S. Markets 
The competitiveness of California's high tech manufacturing within the 
domestic economy becomes evident by examining California's increasing share 
of national employment and output in these industries. Since World War II, 
California's share of both national employment and value added has increased 
dramatically. ln 1947, California's share of national high tech 
manufacturing employment was a mere 2.5%. By 1972, California's share was 
14.5%; and in 1982 it had increased to 21.3%. California was the vortex of 
the electronics and computer revolution. 
In i dual high tech industries, California's dominance in high tech 
manufacturing is most pronounced in computers and office equipment, 
electronics, and communications equipment. The state's share of U.S. 
employment in computers rose from 3.9% in 1947 to nearly 28% in 1982. In 
communications equipment, California's share climbed to 22.9% in 1982. In 
electronic components and parts, California's share of national employment 
in the industry rose from 10.1% in 1963 to 26.2% in 1982. California's 
shares of national employment in instruments and drugs have increased at a 
much slower pace than the shares in computers, electronics, and 
communications. In instruments and drugs, California's shares of national 
employment in 1982 were 14.7% and 9.0% respectively. 
The competitiveness of California's high tech manufacturers is also 
reflected in a comparison of the growth rate of output of high technology 
manufacturing in California against the output for the nation. The growth 
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rate of value added in California hi tech industries clearly exceeds 
that of gh tech producers for on as a whole. Between 1977 and 
1982, the average annual real growth rate in ue added in California high 
tech industry (10.1%) nearly doubled the U.S. growth rate in these 
industries (5.1%}. 
Another way to gauge the competitiveness of California's high tech 
manufacturing, however. is to compare the productivity of high tech 
industries in the United States overall with in California. 
Productivity is measured in terms of dollars of manufacturing value added 
per paid hour of production work. 
Ca1ifornia 1 S electronics and communications equipment industries have 
maintained a strong productivity edge over producers elsewhere in the United 
States since 1963, remaining on average 15% to 20% more productive. 
On the other hand, California 1 S productivity advantage in computers and 
office machines has eroded from an 11.6% advantage in 1972 to a 7.2% 
disadvantage in 1982. The shifts in production facilities out of 
California reflect this erosion in California s productivity advantage in 
computers. 
California has never had a productivity advantage in drug or instrument 
manufacture. California's instrument producers are coming close to matching 
the productivity of instrument makers nationwide. In 1982, California 1 s 
productivity gap in instruments dropped to 6.9%. In drugs, however, 
although California 1 s productivity disadvantage is declining, it remains 
substantial. California drug manufacturers were only two-thirds as 
productive as their national counterparts in 1982. 
Overall, as shown in Table 8, California has a productivity 
disadvantage in computers, instruments, and drugs and has not gained 
significant advantage in communications and electronics. 
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Manufactu in li ia have grown rapidly in recent years. 
In 1981 California was the largest producer manufactured exports among 
the 50 states, with export shipments totaling an estimated $18.8 billion, 
representing 11.4% of total U.S. exports of manufactures. 
California so 1 the nation in 
state ranked first na onally as an expo 
technology exports in 1981. The 
of electric equipment, most 
notably in electronic components and communications equipment; second in 
nonelectrical machinery and instruments; and third in transportation 
equipment. 
California hi tech industry has increasingly focused its marketing 
efforts on international ma • pa cularly the expanding Pacific Rim. 
As output in ectronics computers, instruments have grown, so have 
international rts. Table 9 shows the increasing importance of exports 
in gh technology sectors (data available only at the 2-digit SIC level). 
el 
a 
Since 1970, 
c 
rtation equipment, nonelectrical machinery, and 
been the most important California exports. From 
i es one. 
2 bi lion or more 
es to foreign countries were valued in 1981 
three-fifths of the state total. 
I transpo on equi t. California exports constituted 14.5% of 
' S. exports; on were heavily concentrated in 
ai Nonel ectri nery showed the most rapid growth among 
a's top three sing 64% in real terms from 1977 to 1982. 
i 
communications 
ce machines were the most significant export in this 
c machinery exports--mostly electronic components and 
pment--increased 50% in real terms from 1977 to 1982. 
The interna onal tiveness of California's high tech 
manu res can in by 1 ing at the U.S. share of world exports. 
u.s. lance in hi technology manufactures has remained 
Table 8 
CALl FORtH A'S PRODUCTIVITY ADVANTAGE IN HIGH TECH 
MANUFACTURING, 1963-1982 
(Percentage above or below U.S. average) 
Sector 1963 1967 1972 1977 
Drugs -15. a n.a. -43.5% -37.6% 
Computers n.a. n.a. 11.6 0.5 
Communications 19.9 30.9% 21.9 19.0 
Electronics 23.5 44.5 12.5 17.0 
Instruments -14.3 -l o. 7 -14.7 -11.9 
Source: U.S. Census of Manufactures, 1963-1982. 
Table 9 
CALIFORNIA EXPORTS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL PRODUCTION 
IN SELECTEU SECTORS, 1972-1982 
1972 1977 1982 
Transportation 6.3% 13.7% 18.1% 
Nonelectrical Mach. 10.8 19. 1 23.1 
Electric equipment 7.3 14.0 15.2 
Instruments 6.3 20.0 20.5 
Total Manufacturing 4.5 7.5 9.8 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, State Export Series, 1984. 
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1982 
-33.8% 
-7.2 
23.8 
15.7 
-6.9 
posi ve 
high techno 1 
$5 bill ion. 
it is shri 
in and 
surplus 
It peaked in 1981 at $23.6 billion 
Partial year data cate that the U.S. 
all of 1984 may fall to less than 
Although the United States remains by far the leading exporter of high 
technology manufactures, the decline in U.S. market share shows that other 
nations. particul Japan, are increasi y competitive with the United 
Sta Japan 1 S share of the industrial countries 1 exports of high 
technology products more than doubled between 1965 and 1982 to reach 17.3%. 
Japan dominates the export market for communications equipment and 
electronic components. 
Computers--In office, ng, and accounting machines, U.S. exports 
grew at an average annual com~ound rate of 19.2% between 1965-1982. The U.S. 
share of total exports. grew slightly from 32% to 36.6% during this period. 
Japan recorded the fastest rate of growth among the major U.S. competitors, 
averaging a 31% annual rate of increase between 1965 and 1982. Japan's 
share of total exports rose from 3% in 1965 to 17.% in 19~2. The emphasis 
aced on 
ncreasi 
industry by the Japanese government will make it 
r the United States to maintain or improve its 
is market. The ted States kept its lead in this 
high largely because of its strong position in computers 
and equi U S. market share in the other office equipment 
in the overall grouping was generally much lower than in computers. 
Communications Equipment and Electronic Components--Japan is the 
d's 1 ng supplier in communications equipment and electronic 
ts. Japan's exports in this group grew at an annual average rate of 
22.4% and During this period, Japan's share of total 
rose 16. 36.6%. pments by the United States grew much 
more slowly. a 17. per year increase. The U.S. share of total 
slightly from 20.3% to 21% between 1965-1982. The 
ora ng .S. share in is product group can be traced to weak 
performance in the two largest sectors: telecommunications equipment and 
electron tubes, transistors, and semiconductors. 
Instruments--Japan has overtaken the United States as the world 1 S 
leading exporter of professional and scientific instruments. Japan's 
exports averaged a 21.8% annual growth rate from 1965 to 1982 with strong 
performances in photographic and motion picture equipment and supplies and 
in medical instruments. During this period, Japan's share of total exports 
rose from 8.6% to 21.9%. U.S. exports of instruments grew at 14.4% per year 
over the same period. U.S. market share of total exports declined from 
24.9% to 21.8% during this period. California•s exports of instruments grew 
at an annual average rate of 24.8% between 1969 and 1981, which was higher 
than the comparable growth rate of the United States (16.0%) but lower than 
that of Japan, 25.1%. 
Drugs--U.S. exports of drugs grew at an annual average rate of 13.4% 
from 1965 to 1982. In contrast, those of the other suppliers grew at an 
annual average rate of 14.9%. Export shares are relatively unchanged over 
this period. However, in 1981, the United States recaptured its position 
from Germany as the leading world exporter of drugs. 
Summary of Competitiveness Assessment 
While California's high technology manufacturing has expanded rapidly 
in terms of both employment and value added, it is facing increasing 
competitive threats. California•s productivity advantage has eroded in 
computers and office equipment and has not grown significantly in either 
communications, electronics, or instruments. Japan is increasingly 
dominating international markets for communication equipment, electronic 
components, and instruments and is rapidly gaining market share in computers 
and office equipment. 
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To ma n n veness n ring, 
advantage by creating 
process technology. It must 
vely market its products. 
lifornia increase 
higher-val 
increase worker 
Table 10 summa zes key competi ve advantages and disadvantages in 
high technology manufacturing. In particular, advantages in technology 
(especial in s technology) can be imp Human resource quality 
can improved a greater Federal tax and trade 
policies are a current sadvantage and Cal ia should lobby for changes 
to increase competi ve itions for these industries. The cost of capital, 
ia11y the high inte , another area that requires additional 
attention primarily at federa 1 1 eve 1 • 
The Case 
research and 
its current 
manu 
Whi 
bio 
bio 
to capture 
a 
n 
in California--
gh technology in California can be complete without a 
While b otechnology is still primarily in the 
thus cannot be analyzed as a high 
California, it is important to examine 
al for the state in terms of 
one hand, California 1 s current disadvantage in drug 
is not v1el1 positioned to be a major 
cal products created through biotechnology. 
a center of production may occur elsewhere. On 
as center for the application of 
culture and, because of its positive climate for 
become a center stimula ng new applications of 
in, however, question becomes lifornia 1 a capacity 
its own research. 
Table 10 
COMPETITIVENESS PROFILE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURI 
Disadvanta!le 
Major f4i nor Pari t,l Advantage Minor Major 
External 
Federal policy 
-Changing markets 
• Trade policy 
-
Internal 
Product technology 
-Process technology 
-Human resources • Capital 
-Management • 
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B is as use cally fied living 
ls, or the derived from such cells, to produce 
comme products. le the ini al incentive to develop biotechnology 
came from medical research (and specifically from research on genes 
associated with cancers in some animals). biotechnology products include far 
more than pharmaceuticals--special seeds that produce high-protein corn or 
plants that can lize themselves by fixing nitrogen already available in 
the soil or r, that can be used to ean up hazardous or toxic 
wastes (including a terium that breaks down spilled oil), and products 
that may cut the cost of producing paper and improve the yield by converting 
the lignin that binds the fibers into a less binding substance. However, it 
is still the pharmaceutical aspect of the biotechnology business that offers 
the greatest glamor in the near term, even though the attraction is not 
nearly as strong as it was in the late 1970s and the first two years of the 
1980s. 
Everyone (investors, academics. governments) agrees that the 
biotechnology indus es now emerging will eventually prove economically 
rewarding. However, there are two questions that particularly affect 
biotechnology in California: wi11 the state be the beneficiary of 
significant new employment in biotechnology or will companies (or their 
technology) re to establish commercial production, and are there 
California can take that will encourage high-value-added production to 
take ace thin s rather than elsewhere? 
Industry Structure and Economics 
le 11 lists biotechnology companies in California that already 
have revenues from the sale of biotechnology products. Table 12 lists the 
1 i a bi 
I on, Cali 
ogy companies that are still developing products and 
to expand into commercial production at some point. 
53 other biotechnology companies that have a 
neither sales nor empl and are likely to consist primarily of a single 
aca c researc 
Table 11 
CALIFORNIA BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANI PRODUCT SALES 
Name 
Amgen 
Applied Biosystems, Inc. 
Bio-Rad Laboratories 
Breit laboratories, Inc. 
Cetus Corporation 
Cooper laboratories 
DDI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Diagnostic Products Corporation 
Hybri tech, Inc. 
In tell i genetics 
Molecular Biosystems, Inc. 
Monoclonal Antibodies 
NI~S Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Synbiotics Corporation 
Syncor International Corporation 
Tago, Inc. 
Technic1one International, ltd. 
Urlta Systems, Inc. 
Viratek, Inc. 
Zymed Laboratories 
Chevron* 
Crown Zellerbach* 
Syntex Corporation* 
City 
Thousand Oaks 
Foster City 
Richmond 
West Sacramento 
Emeryville 
Palo Alto 
f~ountain View 
Los Angeles 
San Diego 
Palo Alto 
San Diego 
Mountain View 
Newport Beach 
San Marcos 
Sylmar 
Burlingame 
Santa Ana 
Irvine 
Covina 
South San Francisco 
San Francisco 
San Francisco 
Palo Alto 
*Divisions of these companies are engaged in biotechnology. 
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Ownership 
Publ i ely owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Pub 1 i ely owned 
Pub 1i c 1 y owned 
Publicly owned 
Publ ic1y owned 
Subsidiary 
Pub 1 i c ly O\'lned 
Pub1 icly owned 
Pub 1 i c ly owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Publ i ely owned 
Subsidiary 
vately owned 
Publicly owned 
Publ ic1y owned 
Publicly owned 
le 1 
CALI IA BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES WI EMPLOYEES BUT WITHOUT SALES 
Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc. 
pha Therapeutic · on 
Antibodies, Inc. 
Arco 1 I tute 
Bio-Response, 
Ca 1 gene, Inc. 
California Biotechnology, Inc. 
Chiron Corporation 
Collagen Corporation 
Creative Biomolecules. Inc 
Engenics, Inc. 
tech, Inc. 
INGENE I 
Engineering. Inc.) 
International Plant Research 
Institute, Inc. 
li posome Technol 
Microgenics on 
• Inc. 
es Corpora on 
es 
Dublin 
Hayward 
Davis 
Mountain View 
Emeryville 
Palo Alto 
South Francisco 
0 
South Francisco 
i~oni ca 
San rl os 
o Park 
Concord 
San Diego 
ia 
isco 
Owners11i p 
Publicly owned 
Subsidiary 
Privately owned 
Subsidiary 
Publicly owned 
Privately owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Publicly owned 
Privately owned 
Privately owned 
Publicly owned 
Privately owned 
Subsidiary 
Privately owned 
?rivately owned 
Privately owned 
Privately owned 
Privately owned 
Privately owned 
Privately owned 
Privately owned 
bi 
0 en 
a 
tota 1 techni 
un 
ons cost. 
pharmaceuti products are very 
labor required for development. 
Scale-up for quantity production, 
the 
se me and the 
on ensure homogeneity of 
als 1y cost 
Subsequent cl ni als for 
the product, stabilization of the 
from $5 million to $10 million per 
pharmaceuticals can range from $20 
each new product. It is estimated 
biotechnology pharmaceuticals 11 
Requirements for testing of products 
llion as high as $50 million for 
that at least 75% of those developing 
exacting, although it is necessary 
will not be toxic to consumers 
biotechnology products (e.g., a bacterium 
to 
At present, tes 
potatoes 
less 
remain 
for crop 
ing) 
are held up in some cases by environmental issues ( need for an 
environmental statement, for 
under the purview EPA) 
governs use and testing}. 
Industry Finance 
ol t otechno1 
15 years d. New firms ar.e still 
are now beginning to products to 
biotechnology firms tended to be judged 
scientific r commerci 
well over $1 billion invested in 
7 in new rms sing products rel 
However, since 1983. bi ogy 
went public and have since been li ng on 
products that fall 
c group or agency 
rm is 1 ess 
e t rms 
982 new 
investors on the basis r 
products. Since the late 1970s. 
bi ies. at 1 east 
ng ani cine. 
have and companies that 
inves t are nding that 
interest is ini some nanci is needed if the 
is bring its products to market. 
Genen is an e of a 
Genentech was started in 1976 by a 
that has found a way to survive. 
capitalist and a Stanford 
professor and when i went public in 980 stock offering raised 
$203 million. However. the company moved quickly to license its early 
produc to big ies already had mark ng and production 
capabilities. such as i Lilly & Co. Since then, Genentech has 
begun to build its own and marketing organization. Other 
corporations have sought out corporate investors as the venture capital 
market has lost enthusiasm for biotechnology. Firms using R&D limited 
partnerships, in whi i is primarily made by those looking for 
tax shelters rather ate returns, have increased. 
Investor sophis on has i significantly since the early 
1980s · al investors now demand not just a wonderful product but a 
large 
genetics and 
and 
ci 
sound business acumen. Areas such as plant 
are attracting more capital than human medicine. 
industries, and because production 
, it makes little sense to discuss the 
usua 1 way. It makes more sense to discuss 
tion lies biotechnology. California now has 
the bi ogy industry in the country. 
ia universi tern are substantially 
ishments. However, within the United States, 
ina are inves ng in measures aimed at 
of industry in their states. 
Mas tts n ti some biotechnology activity, has 
oped highly vocal opposition to research and production based on 
recombinant DNA may not be a se ous competitor for industry expansion 
it 1 center 
not on a la 
near 
dwestern states, and eastern 
however. have competi ve advantages 
production side of biotechnol become a 
y 
centers 
tors in 
) ' 
re cause the 
In the 
r~idwest, the concentration of (over of the 
natiOI1 1 S total) and agri ture suggest otechno1 
applications for industry (special chemicals) and farming (genetically 
manipulated plants, fertilizers pestici 
1 i ves tock 11 1 d 
smaller scale biotechnology production. 
In the east, the 
i r di stri on 
new technologies. possibly deve1 
sources. As noted earlier, 
drug manufactu ve 
While California d 
i 
mproved animal medicine and 
commodi 
cal 
di 
rsey. 
es and 
ng of 
hnology 
in 
ications of 
biotechno1 culture and resources 
waste disposal, example), this s less 
the me bei reason 
b technology i is on the more 
di tics and treatment. These 
• and require sma 11 er produc 
are based on production methods that ire 1 
scaled laboratory su cient 
t and 
n approval 
manufacture ( s nee 
e more than a sli 
the 
most o rms are emphasizing 
these more are icensing technologies to larger 
non-Cali ia This is characteristic of most 
biotechnology firms, the need for a large scale 
production capacity, but also because biotechnology firms have the 
capacity to ma 1 ir As a result, alliances with 
large producers de both production and distribution capacity that 
1 on the rm' s 1 ities. While a few California 
rms are to devel own production and distribution 
system, this is to be the case in few future firms. The 
exception to this rule would be rms whose p ts require neither large 
scale production nor tradi di bution systems. Specialized products 
that fit this descri eme in , such as instrumentation 
and in a1 processi even e of production will not 
be so large as to empl s cant numbers of personnel, with the 
on of es re ves. 
k resources 
two significant i 
industry. 
en for a large-scale 
t 1 the necessary expertise 
s 
e. California accounts for 22% of the 
PhDs in chemical engineering. The 
s anning to up a program in 
sees a si ificant need in that field. 
, California has less of the 
al to commercia1iza on than eastern and 
exi ng chemi ants. 
1 s a i can pharmaceuticals or chemicals 
re are a plants in the state, the parent 
not appear to have among those national companies 
i ly n application biotechnology to industrial, 
cultural • 
head qua 
investment in bi 
example). as investors in " 
By contrast. other regions have not only the 
• but so an extensive prior history of 
n firm (i.e .• UpJohn and Dow, for 
windows provided by new 
rms in a ( 
rms in 
r 
v 
companies. 
incorporati ngs into 
The lack of the basic i 
in professional 
environment for movi 
more employment-i 
While California 
well as product 
relatively small. 
product sales and 
ogy firms 
es to i 
Gl oba 11y, 
commercia 1 bi 
industry and has 
Germany are 
technology. so 
invested in relevant process 
countries. , California 
and international markets. 
on. 
ons 
two 
a 
from bi 
ons increase 
be deri ogy. These 
and commercial applications of emerging 
cu1 tural 
troub1 
use of bi 
resources 
tural markets could 
what are 
These strategies involve usi 
value-added products 
elsewhere. This might mean ng new 
ibi 
ess 
the 
a 
is s not 
and 
otechnol 
es 
ve. 
opment of 
to a 
very good. 
forefront innovation as 
1 be 
revenues from 
r 
processing on) 
versi ty resources) 
c 
c t could 
to state's 
a's 1 arge 
candidate for the 
" ies. 
te new, high 
e 
to create 
chemical feed stocks cultural and forestry wastes. generating high 
value minerals and chemicals from mining tailings, and using biotechnology to 
address hazardous waste (which lower industry costs and undesirable 
consequences of production). 
California's universities are working on such applications (U.C. Davis, 
for example). but are still far from direct commercial application. In fact, 
an underlying problem in mobilizing the potential of biotechnology in 
California is the reluctance of the University system to more aggressively 
pursue technology commercialization within the system, and in conjunction with 
industry. 
In addition, while California's current industries may not i>e investing 
in the large-scale application of biotechnology, there are opportunities for 
joint-ventures with overseas rms. The joint venture between ~ngen of 
Thousand Oaks, California, and Kirin Breweries of Japan is one current example 
of this strategy. In the long run, biotechnologies can be expected to play a 
role in virtually every large scale chemical production process--and a good 
many nonindustrial applications, such as drain cleaners--in addition to the 
more visible medical and agricultural applications. 
aspects in which California may find itself at a competitive 
sadvantage include housing costs (biotechnology production workers are 
expected to be id on a level similar to that of biology lab technicians 
rather than a level similar to that of computer designers or chip process 
engineers). the time it takes to get permits, and perhaps environmental 
politics. 
Although environmental and health regulation have been raised as issues 
that mi impede the development of the biotechnology industry--and they 
certainly do at the federal level--the impact of state laws, present and 
future is not yet clear. At the present time, the state regulatory climate 
appears ous but supportive. Industry fears that regulations may impede 
commercializa on have not yet been realized, and the California state 
government appears, at a minimum, inclined to help make any regulatory 
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res work as effectively as si 
ea r in Ca 1 i i a 1 s 
e. ndustry government 
Chemical 
plant pe t application 1a ic 
and sector seem oriented towards a more anal regu1 system. 
Nevertheless, there need only be one incident of note to precip tate a more 
stringent state role in overseeing this emergi industry. 
In the final analysis, the prospects for bi ogy to become a or 
economic asset for California 11 stem more from the ability of this ghly 
science-based indus try to identify and rea 1 i ze commercia 1 app 1 i ons than 
from any incentives that the state could provi 
The state will need to continue to invest in c 
production of skilled professionals in biotechnology. 
and maintaining 
It will to i ove 
university capacity to explore the commerci applications 
science--particularly focusing on "technology capture.. ies that will 
pay off in Cali a. And it 11 need to p to keep business costs for 
this industry within reason, relative to competi 
taxes, and environmental regulation). 
(i.e., ing, 
For the most part, the otechnology indus s success in California 
11 depend on the gradual maturation the industry itself. present 
time. the hi on of rms in Cali ia looks good, 
industry is struggling with difficulties in identifying and p ing 
commercia1izable products. It is also wrestling with management that has a 
ence bias and lacks business direction, has 
technology problems (in many instances}, and 
th the venture capital industry. 
not on scale-up 
lost its favored child status 
Today otechno1 rms are idly being acquired by out of state 
owners, whose corporate cultures sometimes 
rected to o~t-of-state labs and plants. 
ash, and technology is being 
They are licensing the production 
distribution to out-of-state companies, which diminishes return to the 
loc firm. Firms struggling to remain free larger buyers are merging to 
combine research and development strengths with production seale-up 
capabilities. nally 
their disappointment, 
markets that may 
some of ving firms are discovering. much to 
"magic bullets" of biotechnology have indeterminate 
years to cultivate. 
This industry is not analogous to the now more mature computer and 
semiconductor industries. Biotechnology straddles both old and new markets, 
with the potential for dramatic transformation of each. The promises of this 
technology will eventually be realized, th economic benefits being 
distributed far more broadly than in the case of the Silicon Valley. 
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V BASIC MANUFACTURINu IN CALIFORNIA 
Introduction 
Basic manufacturing--consisting of all manufacturing outside of 
aerospace and high technology manufacturing--may be considered a "hidden 
sector .. in the California economy. Most analyses and forecasts of the 
state•s economy tend to focus on more glamorous industries such as aerospace, 
high tech, and financial services or on such obvious California strengths as 
agriculture. The analysis anJ projections of the Center for Continuing Study 
of the California Economy are the only major, continuing analyses and 
projections that break out the basic manufacturing sector. It is often 
assumed that, because of the highly visible declines in such basic 
manufacturing sectors as autos and steel, basic manufacturing as a whole is 
n severe decline and of little importance to the state. This is hardly the 
case. 
After government, the leading producer of jobs in the state is not 
agriculture, not high tech, not aerospace, not finance. It is basic 
manufacturing. There are two important introductory points to make 
concerning this sector. First, as Table 13 illustrates, it is still a very 
large sector of the economy and likely to remain so in the foreseeable 
future. although it will become steadily less important over time. In 1981, 
for example, 66.5% of all manufacturing jobs in the state were in the basic 
manufacturing sector, while aerospace and high tech accounted for 10.3% and 
.2% of manufacturing jobs, respectively. 
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1972 
1981 
1991 
e 13 
ANALYSIS OF BAS MANUFACTURI 
(Thousands) 
Basic as 
Jobs a Percent 
Basic Manu- All r~am1- of all 
facturing facturin9 Manufacturing 
1,104.8 1,536.0 72.0% 
1,342.8 2,018.8 66.5% 
1,558.8 2,532.8 63.0% 
Source: California Growth in the 1980s: 
Study of the California Economy, 
* * * * * 
Second, as Table 14 illustrates, it 
Basic Manu-
facturi ng Jobs 
as a Percent 
of all Jobs 
8,208.5 13.5% 
11 ,298. 0 11.9% 
13,900.0 11.4% 
1983. Center Continuing 
Unlike a state like Michigan where autos steel 
is so strong. California 1 s manufacturing not contain any single 
industry that is an overall national leader. Thus, \'fhile autos and steel are 
in decline, other key industries such as printing and publishing apparel 
are growing. But, perhaps because in no one of these industries is 
California visible as a national leader as it is in aerospace gh 
tech). the sector as a whole does not get as much attention and is not as 
1 understood as other sectors. 
Given its conti importance to 
parti ar1y in light of the strengths 
industries, it is important for the state 
of this part of i economy. Because of 
overall state economy, however, 
of certain basic manufacturing 
to devel a better understanding 
verse nature and ative lack 
Table 14 
TYPES OF BASIC MANUFACTURING IN CALIFORNIA 
Employees 
(Number) 
1977 1982 
Food 163.4 173.5 
Apparel 101 • 1 106.3 
Lumber 67.1 48.4 
Furniture 51.9 52.6 
Paper 35.9 35.5 
Printing and publishing 97.1 131 • 1 
Chemicals 52.7 52.6 
Petroleum 18.5 18.8 
Rubber 63.6 66.1 
Stone and glass 53.0 49.0 
Metals 49.0 42.4 
Fabricated metals 136.2 139.9 
hinerya 110.9 135.2 
Transportation equipmentb 92.9 60.9 
see 11 aneous 40.0 38.3 
a Excluding office and computing machines (high tech) 
b Excluding aircraft and missiles (aerospace) 
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Value Added {$000,000) 
1977 1982 
6,578 10,936 
1 '770 2,505 
1 ,840 1,445 
1,065 1 '71 0 
1 ,310 1, 978 
2,877 5,473 
2,803 4,058 
2,540 4,155 
1 • 618 2,398 
1 ,828 2,283 
1,349 1. 718 
4,012 5,736 
3,327 6,195 
2,806 2,944 
1,070 1 ,667 
rel and 
study n 
The 
on on s 
a lesser 
s 11 
be made in 
i es--au 
ch some 
s sec on. 
s on are: 
i rnia 1 S large and verse basic manufacturing sector is strongest 
in those industries that have creative, exploited advanced 
technologies, developed special market ches (either for export or 
for import substitution), and grouped themselves in economic clusters. 
California 1 s manufacturing industries are affected 
internal and external forces (e.g., foreign trade, 
technologies) that affect other U.S. manufacturers. 
present California industries th threats 
the future. 
same 
on of new 
forces 
opportunities in 
ities Dealing th the threats and 
will require continued effo 
creativity and innovation, 
technologi advancement, 
, and local economic 
agglomerations. 
Background and History 
It is useful to think about basic n categories: 
The tional "smokestack" industries, such as autos, steel, and 
rubber. 
versified manufacturing. includi 
metal products, and other i es. 
printing. iances, 
Most of the smokestack i es were es i i ia during 
mmediately after World War II. The steei i , for e, built 
the fully integrated Fontana steel mi 1 to meet wartime needs. General 
Motors and Ford built major assembly plants (GM in Fremon South • and 
l~uys, and Ford in Pico Rivera and Nilpitas) in the state during the 
1950s and The re industry devel same time 
(Firestone in South Gate Salinas and Goodyear in Los 
Historically, 
industries. 
ifornia has also had strong l 
es). 
processi 
In general, tal-intensive estack industries have declined 
severely in ifornia n recent years. is is where most of the plant 
closings and job losses have occurred. Those firms that survive have 
generally adopted some kind of niche strategy (e.g., using new technologies 
such as minimills to serve local steel markets and using new production 
processes in the NUMr4I plant in Fremont to produce small cars). 
The diversifi manufacturing industries have grown in the state 
primarily as a result of a process of "import substitution," whereby a wide 
variety of industries shift some production facilities to California as 
older facilities become unproductive and new location decisions are made. 
Import substitution occurs when goods produced within the state replace 
goods brought in from other states or other countries. It is understandable 
given the magnitude of the ifornia market that this would happen. 
With some exceptions, most of the diversified manufacturing is for the 
California market rather than for export. And, except for a few special 
cases such as motion pictures, no industry in the diversified manufacturing 
sector can be consi red a national leader. Most of the basic manufacturing 
in state (about two-thirds) takes place in or near the Los Angeles Basin. 
manufacturing sectors in the state, unlike the 
smokestack indus es are generally heal thy and may expect moderate growth 
in the future. Such growth is predicated on the fact that California is one 
of nation's fastest growing 111arkets for all kinds of manufactured goods 
and yet it ill has a substantially below-average share of jobs in most 
indus es in basic manufacturing sector. 
Current Status 
verse na of the ba c manufacturing sector makes it difficult 
to generalize about the sector as a whole. Therefore, three different 
industries within the sector will be examined (autos, steel, and apparel) 
and printing will be examined to a lesser degree. These industries are 
profil in Table 15. 
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Table 1 5 
PROFILES OF BASIC MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN CALIFORNIA 
1963 1967 1972 1982 
Autos 
Number of Establishments 418 397 527 718 624 
Employment (OOOs) 27.0 33.2 39.4 48.6 28.8 
Employ. Share 3.9~ 4.5~ 4.9% 5.5% 4.7'1, 
Value Added ($1,000) 583,424 639,100 1,121,100 1,977.600 1,500,800 
Constant 1972 Dollars 814,042 808,373 1.121 • 100 1.412,067 723,696 
Prod. hrs. {OOOs) 48,403 52,400 64,500 80,000 42.600 
v. A./Prod. hr. 12.4 12.2 17.4 24.7 35.2 
Constant 1972 Dollar 16.8 15.4 17.4 17.7 17.0 
Cal. Prod. Advantage 
over U.S. (1972 $) 19'l. 9% 9% 2% -9% 
v of Shpmts. ($1,000) na 2,344,600 3,991.800 7.352,200 4,691,600 
Constant 1972 Dollars na 2,965,596 3,991,800 5,249,697 2,262,320 
't of U.S. Shpmts. na 5.81. 6.2% 6.21 4.2% 
Steel 
Number of Establishments 69 84 80 115 93 
Employment (OOOs) 19.5 22.4 19.6 17.8 11.8 
Employ. Share 3.4% 3.6'1, 3.5% 3.4~ 3.2% 
Value Added ($1,000) 267.447 378,800 342,000 512,600 641,000 
Constant 1972 Dollars 373,165 479,130 342.000 366,012 309,094 
Prod. hrs. (OOOs) 30,104 35,000 27,800 26,200 16,500 
V.A./Prod. hr. 8.9 10.8 2.3 19.6 38.8 
Constant 1972 Dollar 12.4 13.7 12.3 4.0 18.7 
1963 1967 1972 1977 1982 
Steel 
Cal. Prod. Advantage 
over U.S. (1972 $) -7'1, 4% -11% -14'1, 24% 
V of Shpmts. ($1 ,000) na 907,600 964,500 1,741,300 1,833,200 
Constant 1972 Dollars na 1,147,989 991,500 1,243,342 883,981 
'.t of U.S. Shpmts. na 3.9'Z. 3.4'1, 3.41. 3.9'1. 
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Table 15 (Concluded) 
AeEarel 
Number of Establishments 1108 139 1441 2656 274b 
Employment (OOOs) 31.6 33.1 40.9 58.6 63.0 
Employ. Share 7.8~ 8.1% 9.5~ 13. l'.l; 15.01. 
Value Added ($1 ,000) 214,229 290,200 462,700 1 ,022.700 1,573,200 
Constant 1972 Dollars 298,910 367,063 462,700 730,239 758,607 
Prod. hrs. (OOOs) 48,436 50,200 62,000 86,600 92,000 
V.A./Prod. hr. 4.4 5.8 7.5 11.8 17.1 
Constant 1972 Dollar 6.2 7.3 7.5 8.4 8.2 
Cal. Prod. Advantage 
over U.S. (1972 $) 131. 1St 201. 21% 28~ 
V of Shpmts. ( $1 ,000) na 635,000 971,000 2,104,600 3,317,600 
Constant 1972 Dollars na 803,187 971 ,000 1,502,749 1,599,769 
t of U.S. Shpmts. na 9.7; 11. 7t 16. 51. 18.21. 
Printing and Publishing 
Number of Establishments 3671 3660 4535 5905 6556 
Employment (OOOs) 74.4 82.7 88.0 97.1 131.1 
Employ. Share 8.1'% 8.0% 8.3% 8.9% 10.1% 
Value Added ($1 ,000 846,820 1 ,167,200 1,706,900 2,876,700 5,473,200 
Constant 1972 Dol ars 1,181,554 1,476,347 1,706,900 2,054,052 2,639,213 
Prod. hrs. 85,810 90,500 93,000 100,800 129,200 
V.A./Prod. hr. 9.9 12.9 18.4 28.5 42.4 
Constant 1972 Dollar 13.8 16.3 18.4 20.4 20.4 
2.0% 7.5% 7.3% 2.91. 2.1% 
V of ( $1 ,000) na l. 713,500 2,541,800 4,463,100 8,592,100 
Constant 1972 Dollars na 2,167,341 2,541,800 3,186. 790 4,143,167 
% of U.S. na 7.9% 8.4% 9.0% lO.Ot 
Source: Census of Manufactures 
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one int California was among 
i 
in automobile 
t. au ile on ly in state in 
past 5 years. s is a result both of the economic difficul es of 
U.S. auto firms and the decision by the g reconcentrate their 
faci ities in the i4idwest. Employment in automobile production in 
California dropped a hi 55,000 in 1978 to 28,000 in 1982. 
Shipments dropped from $8.5 billion to $4.7 billion over the same period. 
Most of the major production plants have closed: closed plants at Pico 
Rivera (1980,1aying off 2,300 workers} and Milpitas (1983, laying off 
4,900), GM closed plants in Fremont (1982. laying off 5,860) and South Gate 
(1982, laying off 4,700), and the f4ack Truck ant closed {1981, laying off 
1,400). Not surprisingly, the tire industry that supplied the auto industry 
closed plants about the same time. Firestone osed plants in South Gate 
(1980, laying off 1,400) and Salinas (1981, laying off 1,700) and Goodyear 
closed its plant in Los Angeles (1980. laying off 1,600). 
Today, tire production has ceased completely and only two auto 
production plants remain open in California. One is the the GM plant in Van 
Nuys. The other is the NUMNI plant in Fremont, new GtVToyota joint 
venture to produce small cars in America using advanced technologies and new 
production processes. At the same time, almost all Japanese firms have 
established their :~orth American corporate headquarters in the Los Angeles 
area and some Japanese firms build parts and do some final assembly in 
California (e.g .• Nissan assembles trucks in long Beach). Finally, it is 
interesting to note that an the major U.S. auto firms and some Japanese 
rms have established auto design studios in Southern California. This 
appears to reflect two factors: proximity to a 1 eadi ng school of auto 
design in Pomona and a desire to keep in touch th the style trends in what 
is perceived to be a trend-setting state. 
Steel production has also declined severely in California. From 1978 
to 1982, employment dropped from 18,000 to 12,000 and shipments dropped from 
$2.0 billion to $1.8 billion. US Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and Kaiser Steel 
closed down a11 the integrated steel plants in California between 1978 and 
1983. Foreign steel now dominates the market. What remains are the 
mi mills, whi use new o rent manpower arrangements to 
state's construction and industry produce specialty to 
needs, and steel and ce centers that act as middlemen 
between manufacturers (and foreign iers) and steel users in 
California. The firms that have su the industry shakeout appear to be 
doing well. A new firm, California Steel, has purchased the Kaiser plant in 
Fontana with partners from Japan (who provided the capital) and Brazil (who 
provide low-cost slab). 
In contrast to the smokestack industries (autos and steel), the 
California apparel industry has grown steadily. It is the second largest 
employer in the manufacturing sector. Between 1963 and 1982, employment 
doubled from 31,000 to 63,000, and shipments rose from $635 million to 
$3.3 billion. is concentrated n downtown Los Angeles (and to 
a lesser extent. in San Franclsco) in a fairly concentrated industrial 
district ogous to New York's historic 7th Avenue garment district). 
There is an extensive network of small design firms, job shops, sewing 
contractors • most which are independent. The industry has grown 
up around a cadre of crea ve and well known California designers. It makes 
use of most technologies in the industry (e.g., automated 
cutters, software for rn-making) employs mostly low-skilled, very 
ow id on wo • many of whom are recent immigrants. 
high 
rti 
lifornia's try has succeeded by focusing on the 
ce. gh-va ue-added end of the market--both formal and casual 1vear, 
arly women children. This segment of the market is very 
ve, consta y (four to s x seasons per year), 
consumer-responsive, o a small production runs. Thus, 
un1 ike market such as men's shirts or underwear which are much more 
table, less desi ious, and more suitable to mass production, the 
district, as 
s 
tion for California industry require the creativity of 
network of worki relationships in the Los Angeles 
1 as 
ous and 
imi to the American consumer, particularly the 
California consumer. 
California's printi and publi industry also been growing. 
rose 97. in 1 in 1982. Like apparel, it 
has employed new es, industry agglomerations, and 
succeeded in selected and highly creative market niches. Most of the major 
trade publishing houses continue to be based in New York. However, there 
t1as been an exp1 os ion of sma 11 and speci a 1ty pub 1 i shi ng houses .in 
California. There are now about 500 publishing houses in the state. They 
are concentrated in communities such as Berkeley (50-plus firms) and Santa 
Barbara (more than 100 firms). They focus on such specialty topics as 
bicycling, computers, vegetarian cooking, and solar energy. There are also 
important academic and textbook publishers such as the University of 
California Press, Stanford Press, Silver Burdette, and Addison-Wesley. t4ost 
make active use of new technologies such as computerization. And, while the 
sales of the major publishing houses have been stagnant in recent years, the 
smaller houses have seen steadY growth. 
Analysis of Internal and External Factors 
California's basic manufacturing sector is affected by the same set of 
external and internal factors that affect other U.S. manufacturers. The 
external factors include trade, the business cycle, federal policy, and 
changing consumer tastes. The factors internal to firms include use of 
technology, human resources, financial capital, and management. 
What remains of the auto industry in California is quite fferent from 
that in the f>1idwest in that it is more dependent on imports and relations 
with foreign producers, and has developed special niches within the 
industry. Almost half the cars purchased in Cali ia today are imports. 
In light of this fact and given the state•s proximity to the Pacific Basin 
with its Japanese exports, the strength of the imports favors California. 
Japanese firms have established a variety of facilities here, and with 
pressure for more foreign production in the United States could expand 
further. NUt+II. for example, has announced plans to begin producing Toyotas 
as well as the Novas being produced with GM. The state has become the 
design center of the auto industry because of its role in setting trends and 
styles for the country. 
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Tech ogy is cl a re c factor in both the auto 
product and the production process. GM's purchase of California-based 
Hughes is intended to p GM bri new technology to the manufacturing 
process and could result in new technology links for the state to the auto 
industry. The Japanese involvement in the NUMMI plant may suggest the 
opportunity for more joint ventures with foreign firms in the state. Issues 
such as productivity, quality, and labor/management relations are seen as 
key issues for the industry, and NUMMI is seen as a potential model for new 
practices in these areas. 
Steel is another industry heavily affected by external forces (imports) 
with foreign firms having developed a strong position in imported steel 
slab. California minimills use scrap steel and other firms process low-cost 
imported steel to meet the particular steel needs of California. Since 
California has no integrated mills, it is not as interested as other 
parts of the United States in imposing strict import quotas on slab steel. 
Tl1e market for stee 1 in the state is radi ca 11y different from that in the 
t. Here, the construe on industry uses over half of the steel produced 
in California wi cans for the food processing industry being the second 
"' largest user. In other parts of the country, the automotive and machinery 
industries use most the steel produced. California's announced plans to 
renovate i s, bridges, and other infrastructure could mean a boom 
for the state's steel makers. 
The California 
steel industry have 
;nanagement, and 
produc on 
i 
s. 
rms that have best survived the recent shakeout in the 
that adopted new work rules and styles of 
more modern technology to both products and 
revived California steel plant, as in autos, 
joint rei investment was particularly important. 
California apparel industry differs from the rest of the U.S. 
tex le ch has been in severe decline and is actively seeking 
addi onal import res c ons. By focusing on the design-oriented end of 
the apparel market, California firms have found a niche that seems less 
vulnerable to tion from abroad. 
Within the industry, the rms have attracted top designers and made 
use mmigrants as low-cost labor. rms have tended to form 
omerations in the los Angeles and San Francisco areas; these 
agglomerations have proven essential to keep up with the fast-moving apparel 
market California sells to. The firms have also made good use of the latest 
technologies, such as those being de vel oped by the new industry-sponsored 
Tailoring and Clothing Technology Corporation. 
Similarly, the printing and publishing industry has developed its 
special market niches, as described above. International competition and 
federal policy do not appear to be major concerns for this industry. But, 
again, as with apparel, printing is an industry that has relied on creative 
people, new production technologies, and agglomerations in both southern and 
northern California. 
Competitive Assessment 
In autos, California is at a sig~ificant disadvantage in that the major 
U.S. firms have decided to reconcentrate their plants in the Midwest. 
Productivity in the state has not improved in recent years and the state•s 
share of U.S. shipments has declined dramatically. There appears to be 
little possibility that major U.S. producers will move back to the state in 
the foreseeable future. 
On the other hand, there is at least the possibility (given the 
positive experience to date at NUMt~I) that Japanese or other Asian firms may 
build additional plants in California either by themselves or in joint 
ventures with U.S. firms. Toyota, for example, has announced plans to build 
a ti!ajor U.S. plant. which could be located in the state. However, most 
industry analysts expect future plants to be located in the center of the 
country, in lower cost areas such as Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas. 
Another area of potential growth centers on the GM purchase of Hughes, which 
could provide the state's industries with a stronger link into the 
development of new technology for future cars and future auto manufacturing 
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processes. s could i d on the 1 i s that some il icon Valley firms 
already have th the i try, though, again, California firms would seem 
to be at a disadvantage compared to new high-tech firms emerging in Ann 
Arbor's "Automation Alley." However the NUMf"'I plant could already be 
providing a successful model of advanced manufacturing. If so, then auto 
manufacturers might see some benefit in establishing a plant closer to design 
sources and to those experienced in advanced manufactuing. 
The outlook steel is similar to that for autos in many v1ays. The 
industry's producti ty rates and share of U.S. shipments have been 
relatively stable in recent years. There is no hope that large integrated 
mills will be built again in California or anywhere in the United States 
because of their extreme cost and competition from foreign producers. High 
transportation costs from the East mean that California firms have the best 
opportunity meet the state's needs for steel. Because of the 1 imited 
domestic competition on the West Coast, there may be an opportunity for 
innovative minimills and for steel processors and service centers in 
California to expand ir markets. More joint ventures with foreign firms 
that produce ab more cheaply than U.S. firms may be in the offing (similar 
to the Kawasaki/Cali ia Steel venture). 
Although much the apparel industry has been subjected to foreign 
on in the U.S. the California apparel industry has successfully 
carved out a niche in the high fashion area and appears to have an edge on 
both foreign and domestic competitors. Whi 1 e its productivity rates have 
fairly le. i share of U.S. shipments has approximately doubled 
over past 15 • grm11ing from 9. to 18.2% of the U.S. market. The 
industry pa cu1ar1y aggressive in adopting new manufacturing 
in 
been 
u.s. 
ogies. Thus. ture prospects for the industry look relatively bright. 
Similarly, prin ng and publishing industry has carved out its niche 
speci i i ng areas. While its productivity rates also have 
stable, its u.s. shipments has risen from 9.0% to 10.0% of the 
market. Its future also looks bright. 
A itative assessment the four industries is shown in Tables 16-19. 
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Table 6 
CALIFORNIA AUTO INDUSTRY VS. I~IDvJEST 
Oisadvanta~e Pari tl Advanta2e 
Major Minor Minor r~ajor 
Federal Policy 
Changing Markets 
Trade Po 1 icy 
-Technology 
-Human Resources 
Capital 
-Management 
-
Table ,7 
CALIFORNIA STEEL INDUSTRY VS. THE EAST 
Disadvantage 
Major 
Federal Policy 
Changing 14irkets 
Trade Policy 
Technology 
Human Resources 
Capita 1 
Management 
r~i nor 
-
-
-
Parity Advantage 
!~inor Major 
-
-
-
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Disadvantage 
nor 
icy 
Changi ets 
de Policy 
Technology 
Human Resources 
Capital 
Mana 
-
INDUSTRY V ASIA 
Parity Advantage 
r~i nor Major 
-
-
-
Table 19 
I IA PRINTING INDUSTRY VS. NEW YORK 
Parity Advantage 
nor i~i nor i~ajor 
--
Poli 
-
-
-
Human Resources 
-
ital 
-
-
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Future Prospects--Basic Manufacturing 
i1e making projections of any sector in the economy is ways risky, 
projections of the basic manufacturing sector are particularly difficult 
because of the diverse nature of the sector. However, certain 
generalizations can be made. 
Overall, projections by the Center for the Continuing Study of 
California suggest that the sector will continue to grow and add a 
substantial number of jobs in the future, although this growth will be at a 
slower rate than that of the high tech and aerospace sectors. As 
Table 113indicates, the sector is expected to grow from 1.34 million to 
1.56 million jobs from 1981 to 1991. However, since this growth will be 
slower than the other manufacturing sectors, basic manufacturing's share of 
all manufacturing jobs will drop from 66.5% to 63.0% and its share of all 
jobs in the state will drop from 11.9% to 11.4%. However, it is interesting 
to note that the Center's projections indicate that the state's share of 
basic manufactruing jobs in the country will increase from 7.7 to 8.3% during 
the period of 1981-1991. 
r~1ost of the projected growth will be as a result of the process of 
import substitution, with the state expected to gain an increasing share of 
national jobs in a wide range of manufacturing industries. This seems likely 
because the state currently has a below average share of jobs in many basic 
manufacturing sector industries, in spite of the fact that it is one of the 
na on's fastest growing market areas for manufactured goods. Thus, whatever 
growth occurs in these industries nationally, California is likely to capture 
an ever-increasing share. 
There seems to be little reason to believe that the 11 Smokestack 11 
industries such as auto and steel will ever return to their previous levels 
of activity and employemnt in the state as a result of such factors as 
international trade and the recentralization of the auto industry in the 
f4idwest. 
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ce n manu i es--parti arly 
have established niches or those 
tech and aerospace industries such 
as machinery--waul d average growth rates than the sector as a 
whole. While it is impossible to ct, other industries in the sector that 
ay on the sta 's 
as particularly s 
manufacture of bi 
Implications 
The ana1ysi s 
California--autos, s 
factors out. 
successful 
ns to 
(e.g., creativity, growing markets} may emerge 
or who 1 e new industries may emerge such as the 
products. 
ic manufacturing industries important to 
, and printing--shows certain common success 
a's basic manufacturing industries are most 
ve talent in the state. 
market niches (whether for export or for import 
ng technologies. 
n economic clusters. 
en to support the further development of 
ri industries should generally encourage the 
factors. Such steps could include: 
not just to develop technical skills 
, engi ng, but also to develop 
-;wr.:;;.;;,;_;;..._,;-,....:.:::.._.;;;.;.;_:.................;..:...;_.:::..;;._.;;_;..:_ through support for programs such as the 
opment and application of new manufacturin~ 
keep California firms at the cutting edge. 
manufacturing in the LA area might be 
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Promoting the further development and expansion of regional economic 
clusters by supporting producer-supplier relationships in key 
industries. 
Development of export markets to facilitate the expansion of firms 
that originally developed to serve the California market and now are 
ready for expansion. 
Development of additional markets through import substitution, 
particularly in those industrial sectors where California's share of jobs is below average. 
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Introduction 
li a's 
that technology 
1/I THE 
i 
INDUSTRY IN CALIFORNIA 
indus is prime example of the role 
on have played in shaping the state's economic 
development. Aerospace is one of the state's largest industries. For the 
past 50 years, the industry has ranked as one of California's largest 
employers. • expertise in the scientific fields related to 
aerospace ped to rk the growth of the ectronics industry in Silicon 
Valley. 
The California aerospace industry- ike high technology manufacturing--
also illus tes role that regional agglomerations can play in the 
growth of an Over past 50 years, aircraft production has been 
transfo 
n 
a 
exi 
e 
rce i 
1 i 
ae 
1 i success 
as Stan 
and continue 
th ineers 
more versi ed aerospace industry; however, much of 
was 
in its original location in Los Angeles, 
es. This region had an early comparative 
on and manufacture of aircraft. Some histories 
ces to locate aircraft production there in part to a 
imate (little rain) and the region's 
and ne industries. The presence of 
companies meant that both capital and a ~mrk 
were available in the area, and the Southern 
ted to the tes ng and assembly of aircraft. 
most important factor in 
universities and research centers 
Cal Tech. These institutions were 
in that they supplied the growing industry 
a source of basic research that was 
later applied to aerospace production. This expertise was not limited to 
research and skill in the aircraft industry; because of the complexity of 
the component systems of the industry's product, innovations in related 
techno 1 ogi es--such as meta 11 urgy, fue 1 s, and electric components --have been 
key to the industry's growth. For example, without breakthroughs in 
metallurgy, the development of the jet engine--perhaps the most important 
technological breakthrough in the commercial aircraft industry--would not 
have taken place. As the industry grew, it served to attract other national 
research centers, such as the NASA Ames, Lawrence Livermore, and Lawrence 
Berkeley laboratories. 
It is also important to recognize the extraordinary influence that the 
Federal Government has played in the development of the aerospace industry. 
The U.S. government has always taken an active role in steering the course 
of the industry's development, starting in the 1920s with its air mail 
contracts and continuing through its role as a provider of research and 
development funding (in the areas of military aircraft, and later space 
technology) and as the major purchaser of the industry's products. However, 
although the Federal Goverment has played a decisive role in terms of being 
both a large source of demand and an actual funder of innovation within the 
industry. its decisions were probably not instrumental in affecting the 
heavy concentration of production in California. In fact, during World 
War II, the Federal Government made conscious decisions to locate new 
capacity outside of California and other vulnerable coastal regions. After 
World War II, as the industry consolidated, there was a definite shift back 
to the initial location pattern, in which a high percentage of firms were 
located in the coastal areas, especially California. 
Because the Federal Government is the major purchaser of California's 
aerospace products, federal policy decisions will have a major effect on the 
overall level of industry activity within the state. However, California's 
future competitiveness within the industry will be determined by factors 
over which the state can have some control. 
92 
li a 1 s ae s is currently ding high as a result of 
the combined e ts of increases in military spending, the program to 
develop the space s tion, and the early stages of President Reagan 1 S 
Strategic Defense Ini ative (SDI). re 6, which illustrates California 
* aerospace employment between 1972 and 1985, shows that state employment 
in the production of ai 
226,400 as of July 1 
, guided missiles, and space vehicles totaled 
highest level since the post-Vietnam slowdown 
though the above data do not distinguish between in defense spendi 
1:1ilitary and commercial production, recent industry trends indicate that 
California 1 S aircraft production is increasingly concentrated in military 
planes. Furthermore. recent increases in spending on missiles and space 
vehicles will likely composition of production in California; in 
the past decade, the state captured 50% of U.S. value added and 40% of 
government defense contracts in this industry. 
However, several factors are affecting and will continue to influence 
the state 1 s competi veness within the aerospace industry. The current 
outlook r ia's aerospace industry is for relatively flat 
oyment over near term. Industry experts predict that the DoD budget 
will remain a constant level (in 1984 dollars) through 199S; spending on 
ssi es, airc , and helicopters will decline slightly, while space 
ng should ncrease. However, it is also important to note that the 
overall level of de se funding is vulnerable to changes in political 
* 
ar business 
to be highly volatile (perhaps even more so than the 
es). Although the prospects for a large reduction in 
is unless otherwise noted, the aerospace industry is 
ned to the U.S. Bureau of the Census definition, to 
include SIC 372 (aircraft) and 376 (guided missiles and space 
vehicles). 1ifornia Employment Development Department definition 
includes gh technology industries; these were not included in 
this analysis to avoid overlap with the high technology industry. 
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ta 1 or on dual 
rams ia employment, as 
c di s ons 
s firms are laid 
aerospace firms, or entire 
example, the recent cancellation of 
the jobs of 1,900 workers at the Sergeant rk an aircra gun 
n Layoffs in the aerospace 
industry 11 so employment in the electronics and other 
industries, whi produce rel systems. 
Final re is evidence that concentration on military production 
inhibits the process of innovation and commercial product development that 
can keep California firms competitive in private sector markets. This 
occurs because military distorts both human resources and financial 
capita 1 away from comme products, espec ally in the area of high 
techno! ogy. rna ng and technical workers have been 
very since the the arms ildup, inhibiting nondefense 
Economic anal s have also shown that as capital 
levels of government spending), high-risk 
research and 
markets ti 
investmen --e.g., ng to new 
rst to su r. 
small businesses, like venture 
refore. it is important that 
s not 
rea 
tern a 
1 OS i 
t is 
tors 
its i i 
si ificantly 
is on 
ensure 
of 
i 
more 
t California's natural competitive edge 
on. 
are a 
competition from abroad and an 
ng lifornia's other driving 
upon its aerospace industry. The 
increasingly affected by 
in policy or market demand--and may be 
.. 
in a competitive manner. 
onal manu turing industries. The 
aerospace industry includes military and civil aircraft, engines and 
subassemblies, space vehicles, and the systems parts and components 
incorporated into these final transports. It is characterized by 
high-value-added, low-volume products; the planes and missiles produced are 
expensive but sold in relatively small quantities. These products are 
highly complex, integrating a number of highly sophisticated technologies. 
The complexity of these systems means that products are expensive to develop 
and difficult to test; this leads to a higher than usual degree of risk 
because it increases the likelihoo4 that products will be unsuccessful. 
Industry structure, particularly for aircraft production, is also 
distinctive. Most aerospace work is concentrated among a few, very large 
(but diversified) firms. These firms are also highly interdependent. 
Usually, several firms will be involved in producing a single system, with 
the prime contractor subcontracting pieces of the work to other fi nns within 
the industry. Subcontracting emerged as a means of spreading the risk 
involved in aircraft production and has become more prevalent as firms try 
to cope with an increasingly competitive environment. In the future, 
subcontracts are increasingly 1 ikely to include foreign as well as domestic 
firms. 
Finally, competitiveness is increasingly becoming important to the 
aerospace industry. The industry depends heavily on export markets to 
absorb its productive capacity. Although national defense needs will always 
guarantee some level of demand for domestic production capacity, the main 
industry strength in the past few decades has been in exports. Aerospace 
products--both civil and military--have been the largest source of U.S. 
export sales in recent years. 1982 aerospace exports totalled $15.6 
billion, with an industry trade balance of $11 billion. In the years 
between 1977 and 1982, 75% of total aerospace exports were in civilian 
aircraft. It has become impossible for commercial aircraft firms to be 
profitable--let alone competitive--if they cannot continue to capture a 
significant share of foreign demand. Table 20 summarizes the forces 
currently affecting California's aerospace industry. 
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External Factors 
The business cycle has played an important role in California's 
increasing concentration in military production. Sales of commercial 
aircraft are directly affected by business cycles; the recessions and oil 
shocks of the mid 1970s and early 1980s were particularly bad times for 
commercial aircraft producers. During that same time Lockheed's near 
failure due to poor sales of the L-1011 (which was in part a result of these 
recessions) also contributed to an increasing degree of risk aversion within 
the industry. Because defense contracts rely on appropriated funding, 
military contracting is somewhat insulated from cyclical changes in the 
nation's economy. To some extent, this means that military spending can be 
advantageous in that it can reduce the state economy's sensitivity to 
cyclical fluctuations. For private firms this insulation--when combined 
with the government's willingness to subsidize the capital costs of 
developing a new product (thereby reducing the risk to the airline 
company)--provides a tremendous incentive for firms to concentrate on 
military rather than commercial production. 
Changing markets in the commercial aircraft sector are another key 
factor in California's movement away from civil production. Several years 
ago, increases in fuel prices and deregulation of the airline industry led 
to a change in the demand for commercial aircraft. Airlines began to demand 
mid-sized, fuel-efficient planes in the face of higher fuel costs and 
changing service patterns brought about by deregulation; this trend 
continues today, although to a lesser extent. 
Accompanying this change in demand has been the emergence of increasing 
competition in the supply of both commercial and military aircraft. Tne 
Japanese are the newest entrants; MIT! plans to subsidize the development of 
their commercial as well as their existing military production capacity. 
Furthermore. the Japanese have been extremely successful in extracting 
licensing and joint production agreements which give them access to U.S. 
technologies. As a result, they will eventually be able to manufacture 
products completely within Japan. 
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balance of trade in aerospace, which showed declines in 1982 and 1984 after 
steady increases between 1972 and 1 ng whi time the compound 
growth rate in exports exceeded the 6.7% growth rate for imports). 
Because of heavy federal involvement as both a supplier of R&D funding 
and the number one purchaser of aerospace products (the Federal Government 
accounted for 70% of total 1983 aerospace sales), federal policy will 
continue to shape much of California's aerospace industry. The policies 
with the greatest effect will be those with a seemingly indirect connection 
to military spending. Although decisions regarding the total level of 
defense spending, the level and allocation of R&D funds, and the means by 
which DoD contracts are let will affect California firms, their effects on 
overall competitiveness will probably be marginal in California's aerospace 
industry. 
Policies regarding U.S. trade and research and development practices 
will have more serious effects on the state. Trade policy is very important 
in terms of California's ability to compete in export markets. If other 
nations can continue to secure offset agreements with U.S. firms while 
maintaining policies of protecting domestic markets and subsidizing the cost 
of capital, it is likely they will be able to maintain existing price 
advantages and continue to siphon away our technologies while building their 
own ability to produce aircraft. Trade policies aimed at opening markets 
and securing a 11 leve1 playing field" for competition could help to stem this 
current trend. 
Policies and procurement practices that relate to research and 
development costs within the industry will also have a major impact on the 
competitiveness of the state • s civil aircraft industry. The U.S. Department 
of Commerce has stated that the most important factors in the future 
competitiveness of the civil aircraft industry will be the cost and risk of 
developing new products. Decisions regarding individual weapon systems will 
also be critical issues because of their impact on employment. Although 
California is likely to continue to capture a good portion of defense and a 
majority of new space contracts, the high volatility of individual 
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Human resources is also an area in which California has a comparative 
advantage, because of the high skill level of its labor force. In recent 
years, there has been a problem with meeting the industry's need for 
qualified personnel. Shortages of engineering and technical personnel 
resulted because of the combined forces of the recent buildup in defense 
spending and the aerospace industry's need to outbid the ~lectronics 
industry for engineers and technical personnel. In the near future, it is 
likely that labor market conditions will ease (except in the area of 
electrical engineers), as defense spending levels off and especially if the 
U.S. electronics industry continues to face weakened demand. 
Financial capital has always been a source of concern to commercial 
aircraft firms because development costs are so high. The cost of 
developing a new model of aircraft now runs into the billions of dollars. 
These high costs must be amortized over limited production runs. Thus, not 
on 1 y is product deve 1 opment more risky, but the cost of financing the 
development becomes a substantial portion of the price of finished aircraft. 
Therefore, foreign firms that receive capital directly from the government 
or borrow at subsidized rates have a significant cost advantage over U.S. 
firms that must pay the market price for capital. Because R&D costs for 
military aircraft or space projects are included in the contract fees, U.S. 
firms face a strong incentive to concentrate on government contracts. An 
important issue for the future will be whether domestic firms can find a way 
to compete in the commercial markets in the face of growing foreign 
competition that is relatively insulated from development financing costs 
and the concomitant high risks. Additionally, capital availability for 
commercial products may be a growing problem, as the success of Airbus 
reduces the attractiveness of investing in U.S. firms, which already tend to 
earn moderate to low rates of return on investment. 
,'4anagement practices wi 11 be cri ti ca 1 to aerospace industry success in 
the increasingly competitive environment for both military and commercial 
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Table 21 
CALIFORNIA AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
Value Added 
( $ mi 11 ions) 
1978 1982 
3,509.4 
2,884.1 
6,539.8 
5,943.8 
CA Share of Value Added 
1978 , 982 
23.89% 22.17% 
65.73 60.30 
33.50% 31.72% 
Productivity 
Advantage 
1978 1982 
1.154 
1.164 
1.082 
1.157 
CA Share of Total Em~lo.z:ment 
, 978 1 82 
21.16% 20.66% 
57.33 52.76 
26.86% 26.16% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1978 and 
1982 
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1972 and 1984. These data indicate that the state's share of aircraft 
raanufacturing has been relatively constant over the last two decades, and 
illustrate the point that California has to date been able to maintain its 
competitive advantage in aircraft production. 
However, two other trends within the industry have important implications 
for the lth of the state's economy. As Figure 7 illustrates, the yearly 
changes in aerospace employment indicate that the overa11 number of jobs 
tends to be very volatile. For example, while California aircraft 
employment declined by over 1 between 1975 and 1976, its growth rate 
between 1973 and 1979 (only 3 years later) was almost 20%. This volatility 
occurs because the commercial and military markets tend to be very unstable, 
with demand highly sensitive to business cycles and political winds, 
respectively. The nature of the airline industry is a key factor in the 
volatility of demand for civil aircraft; because the demand for airline 
travel is highly lical, the aircraft industry also suffers when the 
is in a recess on. 
measure that is often used to assess aircraft industry 
nnance is of commercial aircraft deliveries. In the past 
decades, large transport market of the civil aircraft industry has 
nated by three major firms, McDonnell-Douglas {formerly Douglas 
Ai rcra ) , , and ng. these firms have concentrated 
ta 
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1 i 
ny to 
rt ac vities wi in single states (McDonnell Douglas and 
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se are on in which California data are available because of 
Census Bureau restrictions concerning disclosure and proprietary informa-
tion. The data for SIC code 372 include military and civil production. 
Table 22 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND NASA PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS BY STATE 1973-1983 
Department of Defense Top Four States 
(in Millions of Dollars} 
Percent Percent 
Year State DoD Total DoD Total State NASA Total NASA Total 
1973 $ 30,065 100% $2,116 100% 
CA 6,215 21 CA 696 33 
NY 3,476 12 FL 215 10 
TX 2,232 7 co 194 9 
1>1A 2,024 5 ML 182 9 
1975 $ 37,319 100% $2,299 100% 
CA 7,908 21 CA 1,082 47 
NY 3,744 10 TX 204 9 
CT 2,349 6 FL 170 7 
TX 2,024 5 co 101 4 
1977 $ 55,449 100% $2,882 100% 
CA 10,078 22 CA 1 ,417 49 
NY 4,300 9 TX 237 8 
TX 2, 778 6 FL 234 8 
MA 2,396 5 ML 196 7 
1979 $ 56,653 100% $3,487 100% 
CA 11,674 21 CA 1,439 41 
NY 4, 912 9 FL 369 10 
TX 4,236 8 TX 306 8 
CT 3, 777 7 ML 257 7 
1981 $ 85,880 100% NA NA 
CA 16,629 22 
TX 7,416 9 
NY 6,481 8 
MA 4,596 6 
1983 $ 131,891 100% $5,668 100% 
CA 26,387 22 CA 2 t 131 38 
NY 9,635 8 FL 774 14 
TX 8,229 7 TX 526 9 
VA 7. 072 6 ML 408 7 
1984, Jan - Mar 1984 
$40,315,535 6,142 
CA 9,201,535 24.9 CA 2,150 3~. l 
NY 3,293,458 8.9 FL 817 13.3 
r~o 3,145,032 8.5 TX 587 9.6 
MA 3,019,854 8.2 MD 478 5.6 
Source: Department of Defense; Directorate of Information, Operations, and 
Reports; 1974-1983 data as cited in California Assembly office of 
Research Briefing paper, 11 The Impact of Defense and Aerospace 
Funding on California's Economic Development, December 1984 
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FIGURE 7 TOTAL AEROSPACE EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA 
Figure 8 illustrates the share of commercial jet deliveries for those 
regions which have developed commercial jet industries. At this time, the 
United States and Europe are the only areas that produce large transport 
planes. California's share of completed aircraft deliveries has decreased 
steadily since the early 1970s, while the Airbus share has suddenly emerged 
from zero to 18.3% since 1973. This does not indicate that European 
competition has increased; instead, the Airbus consortium has emerged to 
take up what has always been a fairly strong European role within the 
industry. What is important for the future is the next step: how willing 
are the consortium governments to make a further convni tment that wi 11 a 11 ow 
an already strong industry to maintain cost advantages as new, more advanced 
models of aircraft are developed? And how will European success reinforce 
the current trend for California producers to concentrate in military 
production? 
These data do not tell the full story on California's competitiveness 
in commercial aircraft. A decline in the share of airplane deliveries need 
not indicate that California has lost much of its production of commercial 
aircraft. Even though firms may not be assembling completed planes, many 
California firms are involved in the production of commercial aircraft 
parts. For example, Northrop manufactures 40% of the Boeing 747, mainly the 
fuselage, which it ships to Washington state by train. The interdependence 
among U.S. aerospace firms means that a healthy and competitive Boeing 
benefits California residents as well as those in Seattle. However, a 
healthy 1•1cDonnell Douglas is likely to bring more employment benefits to 
California than will subcontracts for Boeing. 
The decline in California's relative share of commercial aircraft 
deliveries has several causes. New models or design modifications require a 
long lead time; aircraft manufacturers cannot respond to sudden changes in 
the demand for planes. Therefore, in the short term, a company's success in 
selling particular models is a function of variables that are outside its 
control; for example, higher energy prices have been a major factor in the 
recent popularity of smaller, more fuel efficient planes (such as the 
r4D80). Lockheed's near failure with the L-1011 resulted in part from the 
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fact that it placed its 11 bet 11 at the wrong time, and could not sell its 
planes due to the combined factors of design problems and a severe recession 
during which airlines couldn't afford new planes. 
Increases in the costs of development mean that firms must sell 
approximately 400 planes to break even on the cost of developing a new model 
(this figure varies of course, according to the exact type of plane). 
Models are not considered to be successful unless there are significant 
sales and deliveries over the first 10 years and sales are significantly 
above the break-even point. The Boeing 727 and DC-9 (now the MD80) are 
perhaps the only clearly successful programs of the 1 ast two decades; both 
had sales of over 700 in the first 10 years. Even at this sales level, the 
rates of return on projects tend to be 1 ower than the average for all 
manufacturing industries. 
As airlines become less willing to purchase new aircraft and new 
competitors emerge, the potential for reaching the break-even point is 
reduced. Table 23 shows the total sales and profits (losses) of the three 
U.S. firms producing large transports in 1971-1981. That Boeing was the 
only company to make a profit during this time highlights the degree of risk 
involved in producing large transports. 
California•s decline in the share of commercial jet deliveries also 
reflects strong incentives to specialize in military production. This 
decrease will occur even though projections of the demand for civil aircraft 
call for a relatively high number of bookings over the next 2 years. Since 
1980, the increase in competition and level of risk has been accompanied by 
a huge increase in military spending. Because the government finances 
production, development, and testing costs for military hardware, firms have 
an incentive to concentrate on military (rather than high-risk commercial) 
production, even though military contracts also have lower-than-average rates 
of return. Lockheed is basically out of the commercial aircraft business, 
and even though McDonnell Douglas has been quite successful in selling its 
MD80 version of its OC-9, it plans to increase its share of military-
related production by a significant percentage within the next few years. 
California firms will continue to manufacture civil aircraft parts, however. 
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AIRCRAFT SALES AND PROFITS, 1971-1987 
Sales ($ bill ions) Profit or loss ($millions) 
Year B MD L B MD [ 
1971 2.6 0.6 0 165 ~JA ( l 71 } 
1972 1.8 1.1 0.3 119 NA ( 124) 
1973 2.6 1.3 0.7 113 NA ( 70) 
1974 3.0 L 0.8 167 NA ( 49) 
1975 3.0 L3 0.6 201 NA ( 94) 
976 3.3 1.0 0.4 249 NA ( 125) 
977 2.5 0.7 0.3 196 ( 50) ( 170) 
3.8 .0 0.3 417 ( 60} ( 119) 
1979 6.4 2.0 0.5 611 ( 56) ( 188) 
7.6 2.2 1.0 678 ( 144) ( 199) 
7.0 2.4 1.9 308 ( 85) 216 
rce. u.s. rtment Commerce, "Competitive Assessment of the 
ted Ci l Aircraft Industry," 1982 
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As for its future in civil aircraft production, California can expect 
to experience continued volatility in employment due to the cyclical nature 
of the demand for large transports. According to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, the extent to which foreign competition will be able to continue 
to increase its share of production of both parts and final deliveries will 
depend to a great extent upon the degree of technological change within the 
industry. If technology remains essentially constant, U.S. firms (McDonnell 
Douglas and Boeing) should continue to do fairly well. . In the face of a 
complete replacement of current models--meaning a replacement of jet engines 
with new propfan models currently under development by U.S. firms--U.S. 
firms choosing to remain in the market (particularly Boeing) will do very 
well because they have chosen to invest in the development of this new 
technology. Airline industry problems leading to continuing uncertainty and 
increasing competition for aircraft orders would threaten U.S. and 
California market share most, because the Airbus models are the cheapest and 
most efficient planes currently in production. To some extent, this 
magnitude of the threat also depends on Japanese decisions as to whether to 
produce planes entirely in Japan or to continue to negotiate joint 
production agreements. t4aintaining the competitiveness of U.S. civil 
aircraft production will benefit California, regardless of which state 
delivers the planes. The key to that, and thus the most important factor to 
address, is the cost and risk of developing new aircraft. 
Table 24 summarizes the competitive position of Ca1ifornia•s civil 
aircraft industry in regard to its foreign competitors (mainly the Airbus 
Consortium). An important conclusion of this analysis is that at least in 
part, California's disadvantages all relate to differences fn national 
policies. Our own policies in the defense sector create large incentives to 
produce (and therefore, undertake research and development) for government 
rather than private markets. Industry policies in other nations place U.S. 
firms at a disadvantage because they insulate their producers from business 
cycles, and reduce their cost of capital below the market rates that U.S. 
firms face. 
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This assessment also illustrates that California has managed to 
maintain its edge in those areas which provided it with an early comparative 
advantage in aircraft production. Firms within the state remain leaders in 
the areas of process and product technology, and our human resource skill is 
still a major advantage. Management is also a strong point in the area of 
commercial production because in-state firms have developed expertise in 
managing complex technology projects. 
Projections for the Future 
The preceding discussion highlights the fact that much of California•s 
aerospace industry is in a mature stage, in which increasing competition 
opens the possibility for an increase in the state•s concentration in 
military production, if not a loss in total employment. Providing that it 
maintains the superiority of its research and education institutions and its 
workforce, California•s technological edge should allow it to maintain its 
existing share of aerospace employment. However, given the nature of the 
industry, employment will remain volatile, especially as it becomes 
increasingly dependent on military spending. 
These trends are unlikely to have a major impact on the California 
economy in the very short term. The recovery in the airline indus try, and 
therefore strength in bookings for commercial aircraft, is expected to 
continue through 1986. Military spending should not slow significantly 
during that same time period, as spending appropriated during the Reagan 
a~ninistration•s early buildup is still in the pipeline. However, current 
political and economic trends, as well as past experience, indicate the 
possibility of a major downturn in the longer term. 
Increasing competition, leading to greater internationalization of 
production (in which domestic producers are involved in co-production 
agreements with firms of other nations), will continue in the future, 
especially in the absence of a U.S. trade policy that can address the issue 
of protected overseas markets. Forecasts for a lagging economy and low 
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scenario in which military spending is reduced significantly total 
elimination of the MX program (16,000 California aerospace jobs) could lead 
to a total loss of 55,360 jobs. Alternatively, given June 1985 employment 
levels of 226,400, an across-the-board cutback of 6.9% in total aerospace 
employment (similar to that experienced in the post-Vietnam period) could 
result in a total job loss of 54,050. 
These estimates are obviously very rough projections of the potential 
impact of a defense slowdown. It may be that the political impacts of job 
losses of this magnitude may in some cases be enough to prevent total 
cancellation of major programs. However, the important point is that an 
industry that is increasingly dependent upon military and other government 
projects will be even more susceptible to employment losses of this type. 
Furthermore, the result of increasing concentration in military-related 
production will be to produce an industry that is increasingly unable to 
compete effectively, by reinforcing existing bureaucratic structures and 
management cultures. Larger aerospace firms will be unable to diversify 
into nonmi 1 i tary production when defense spending drops off. Furthermore, 
concentration on sophisticated military systems with no or limited 
commercial applications (e.g., stealth technology) may inhibit other needed 
innovation at a time when California's competitiveness is especially 
dependent on its ability to develop new production processes and products. 
What can California do to minimize the effects that increasing 
competition and the volatility of military and commercial demand have upon 
employment within the state? The state's overall strategy should be to 
maintain its existing share of aerospace employment while attempting to 
diversify into commercially-oriented segments of the industry where growth 
is taking place. Actions in the four following areas will be important in 
achieving this overall goal: 
(1) Maintaining the technological and human resource superiority that 
is a direct result of nationally prominent universities and 
research centers. This requires continuing investment by the 
state, as a means to maintain the technological edge which has in 
the past been the primary reason for the states dominance in the 
industry. 
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(4) Providin~ assistance for firms or workers wishing to move into 
related 1ndustries. There may a1so be potential areas for new 
growth in other high technology areas in which aerospace workers 
or entire firms could be successful . Recent studies of the demand 
for high technology workers showed considerable competition 
between the aerospace and electronics industries for skilled 
workers (both professional and technical), even to the extent that 
a lack of skilled workers once threatened the growth of the 
state's electronics industry. In times of reductions in military 
spending or slow demand for civil aircraft, facilitating the 
transfer of aerospace workers into industries where their 
technical skills can be applied will be an important part of any 
adjustment program. However, even in the absence of the immediate 
need for these types of services, assistance in developing 
information about potential markets and in obtaining financing are 
means by which the state could play a role in assisting firms that 
wish to diversify into high-technology areas outside of the 
aerospace industry. 
A more specific discussion of the above policies and/or programs--as 
they fit in with a more comprehensive state strategy on competitiveness--is 
set forth in the final section of this report. The recommendations above 
fit well with programs that could address the needs of many of California's 
industries. Within the context of the aerospace industry, this approach 
will allow the state to maintain its current employment base, while shifting 
toward firms that operate in a more competitive environment that is less 
dependent on federal spending and decision-making. 
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Important Trends in California•s Financial Service Industry 
Four important trends that influence the future structure of the 
California financial services market and the role it plays in the California 
economy are discussed here. 
First, federal and state deregulation has opened up this market and 
will increase sources of competition for consumer and commercial clients in 
the state--with or without interstate banking. California commercial banks 
can expect to claim a lower share of the overall market in the state in the 
future. Money center banks outside of California, as well as foreign-owned 
banks, will increasingly be able to serve California through traditional and 
nonbank products, such as credit cards, insurance, and brokerage services. 
California consumers are reported to be less loyal to state 
institutions than consumers in smaller states and will turn to providers 
whose credit criteria are more generous than those of California banks. 
Furthermore, while California commercial banks have an extensive branching 
system, which gives them local access to customers, this is also a 
significant cost not experienced by out-of-state banks, or smaller 
foreign-owned banks in the state. This means that there will be pressures 
on California banks to close marginal branch offices, reduce workforce, and 
increase marketing of services beyond those of traditional banking to 
include brokerage, real estate, insurance, data processing, and consulting. 
Savings and loans are now empowered to compete against traditional 
commercial banks. This will not reduce the California share of the consumer 
market, but will increase the spread of market share within the state. 
Although many savings and loans are financially troubled, they are generally 
improving their financial stability. 
Foreign-owned banks, particularly the Japanese, are becoming a 
significant factor in the California market. Almost 20% of assets are now 
owned by overseas banks. While control over where invesuoent of deposits 
are made is not currently an issue, the profits are going overseas--not 
unlike the other instances of foreign manufacturing in the United States. 
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The source of value-added in the·financial sector is primarily in the 
process of providing services to end users, and in the profit from loans and 
investments. The health of the California consumer and commercial segments of 
the economy will determine the demand for financial services. The source·of 
value added to product (i.e., a financial service) will shift in the future. 
There will be more reliance on electronic technology for transactions, and a 
major shift in employment from face-to-face customer service to back-office 
transactions and management. In reality, new products will be where 
California•s value added will come from, not traditional banking services. 
Finally, California• financial service industry--including those segments 
not discussed here (venture finance and investment banking) have played a 
critical role in enabling industry to respond to changing competitive 
factors. It is here that state policy has played one of its more effective 
roles--although more could be done--in helping the marketplace work. 
Structure and Trends in California's Financial Services Industry 
California•s depository institutions include commercial banks (which make 
business, industrial and consumer loans), savings and loans {which primarily 
make home loans and some other real estate loans), and credit unions (which 
rnake a wide range of consumer loans). 
Size of the Industry 
In 1984, California's commercial banking sector included over 440 
companies with 5,100 offices (Findlay Reports for California Banks). 
California's share of commercial banks was 3.0% in 1984. 
In 1976, there were 18 foreign-owned banks in California. Crocker bank, 
purchased in 1985 by Midland Bank of England, brings the current total of 
foreign-controlled banks to 29. Foreign-controlled banks had $32.2 billion in 
total assets and $24.8 billion in deposits in 1984. Of California's 
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California has a larger share of S&L employment and a smaller share of 
credit union employment. Employment in California S&Ls has grown consistently 
over the past 15 years, reaching about 70,000 workers in 1984 or almost 22% of 
the national total. Nationally, S&Ls employed 106,000 people in 1970, when 
California's share of the total was 14%. California credit unions employed 
about 10,000 persons in 1984, or 11.8% of total U.S. credit union employment. 
Assets 
In 1984, California commercial banks had $231.5 billion in assets for 
domestic offices and a total of $278.1 billion for both domestic and foreign 
offices (Findlay Reports for California Banks). This reflects fairly steady 
growth over the past 15 years. Foreign assets have represented from 20% to 
30% of California bank domestic assets since 1976--around 10% above the 
national average, which has grown from 15% to 25% since 1976. 
California•s banks currently hold 10.8% of total U.S. domestic assets and 
11.4% of combined domestic and foreign assets. California's share peaked in 
1981 with a 12.0% share of domestic assets and 12.9% of combined assets. 
However, a look at a purely artificial measure--bank assets per capita in the 
four largest banking states in 1981--shows a somewhat different picture: 
New York 
Illinois 
Texas 
California 
$15,593 
10,842 
9,054 
8,240. 
California does not have the same per capita level of bank assets as the 
other three most important banking states. In part, this reflects the 
importance of California's S&Ls. 
California S&Ls had $252.1 billion in assets in 1984, up from 
$120.5 billion in 1980. California S&L assets grew 20% from 1983 to 1984. 
California's S&L share of the nation's S&L assets was 13.6% in 1970 and has 
risen to 25.7% of total U.S. assets today. 
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Table ?5 
PROfiLE Of CALIFORNIA'S DEPOSITORY SEGMENT 
OF THE FINANCIAl SERVICES INDUSTRY 
1970 1976 1982 1984 
Number or Percent of Number or Percent of Number of Percent of Number or Percent of 
Amount National Amount National Amount Nationa 1 Amou'!!_ National 
Commercial Banks 
Companies (No.) 144 1.1'1'. 210 1. 5t. 360 2.5t. 440 3.0'£ 
Offices (No.) 3,062 8.61 3,783 8.21 4,904 9.0 5,100 9.2 
Total assets ($ billion) 
Domestic 58.6 10.2 108.7 10.7 223.1 11.9 231.5 10.8 
Domestic and foreign 
-- --
144.1 12.2 275.5 12.6 278.1 11.4 
Employees (No.) 106,700 11.1 151,200 12.0 200,800 13.3 190,000 12.7 
Gross Profits ($ billion) 2.2 9.8 9.8 11.6 10.7 12.0 11.2 11.6 (1983) (1983) 
....... 
N 
O"l Savings and loans 
Companies (No.) 222 3.91 164 3.4 171 4.51 202 6.0t. 
Offices (No.) 896 9.0 2,068 12.4 3,241 19.4 3,625 17.3 
Total assets ($billion) 32.7 18.6 69.1 17.6 153.4 21.7 252.1 27.9 
Total deposits ($ billion) 25.0 17. 1 57.1 17.3 108.7 19.2 171.0 23.6 
Employees (No.) 15,300 14.4 27,900 15.0 49,200 17.8 70,000 21.8 
Gross profits ($ billion) 0.6 20.0 1.6 20.0 0.1 7.1 33.3 23.9 (1983) (1983) 
Credit Unions 
Entities {No.) 
-- -- 1,655 ( 1978) 
7.5 1,300 6.5 1,188 6.5 
Total assets ($ billion) 
-- --
9.6 15.7 12.6 15.2 15.2 12.9 
Total deposits ($) 
-- -- --
15.2 -- 15.1 -- 13.2 
Employees (No.) 
-- -- -- -- -- --
10,000 11.8 
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Gross Profits per Employee 
Gross profits per employee are a measure of productivity that is of 
increasing concern during this period of financial industry restructuring. 
California commercial banks generated $57,000 in gross profits per employee 
in 1983 for domestic and foreign offices, up from $46,000 per employee in 
1980. This 1983 level is slightly below the national figure of $60,000 per 
employee for domestic and foreign offices, just as California's 1980 level 
of $46,000 was slightly below the national figure of $48,000 per employee. 
This difference reflects the large number of branch banks in California. 
The gross profits per employee of California banks have declined from 
105% of the national average in 1978 to 89% in 1983. To some extent, this 
decline reflects declines in profits resulting from market shifts but it 
cannot be dismissed as solely resulting from profit declines. California 
banks have had difficulty in restructuring their work force to meet today's 
needs. 
California S&Ls generated $55,000 in gross profits per employee in 
1983, down from the 1980 figure, but far better than the $2,000 per employee 
in 1982. The 1983 California figure was well above the national S&L level 
($45,000 per employee). 
Gross Profits As a Percent of Total Assets 
The gross profits of California commerci a1 banks were 4% of tota 1 
assets in 1983, up from 3.7% in 1980 but below the national average of 4.1% 
California S&L gross profits were 1.7% of total assets in 1983, down from 
1980 out well above 1981 and 1982 and above the national average (1.7% vs 
1. 5%). 
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Table 26 
SUMMARY OF FORCES AFFECTING FINANCE 
Growth of the Pacific Basin markets provides an opportunity 
for California•s expansion as a financial center for the 
Pacific region. 
High interest rates and inflation have increased competition 
for deposits and the cost of providing financial products. 
Deregulation has blurred the lines among financial 
institutions and affected the cost of funds and services to 
customers. Interstate banking will have a major effect on the 
number and size of firms within the industry. 
Changing demographics and increasing sophisitication among 
consumers have changed the demand for financial services. 
Introduction of electronic funds transfer, including ATMs, 
has affected the types of services that consumers demand, 
location of bank offices, human resource needs within the 
industry, and cost of transactions. California banks have led 
in the adoption of these new technologies. 
Increase in demand for workers with ability to handle 
complex data processing activities. Fewer tellers needed and 
more consumer service representatives with ability to 
communicate sophisticated knowledge of services to customers 
Higher inte1·est rates exacerbate the difficulty that small 
banks have in obtaining low cost sources of funds. 
Increased competition in a deregulated environment requires 
more innovation, enterpreneurial management with greater 
attention to product differentiation, marketing, quality of 
services and attention to customer need. 
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These offices are for loan production and are legal if the offices do not 
take deposits. Overall, the issue of interstate banking is more a question 
of making competition more overt than it is one of enabling new competition. 
The capacity to cross borders is confined mostly to the larger banks. 
Larger money center banks (New York, Chicago) perceive the California 
market as ripe for interstate banking because the California market is so 
dominated by the big five banks. Their view is that they can offer more 
competitive services because the existing banks are inefficient. In fact, 
California's extensive branch-oriented commercial banking system is both an 
advantage and a disadvantage in the new competitive market. Branches 
provide a direct marketing and distribution advantage, but they also create 
a large overhead and need for extensive revenue generation. California's 
commercial banking industry is less productive per employee because of the 
extensive branching system with its larger number of nonrevenue employees. 
Banks are now closing branches and reducing their workforce to meet the 
changing market conditions. 
The legislation that enabled S&Ls to enter more traditional and 
nontraditional banking services has had an important effect on the 
performance of California's S&L industry. S&Ls have been slower than banks 
to adapt to new competitive pressures, and have had a number of problems in 
entering markets they were not equipped to compete in. In addition, many 
S&ls diversified into (or were created to enter) specific market niches, 
such as development financing, with some negative consequences. 
Changing r~arkets 
The health of Ca1i.fornia's commercial banking and S&L industry has been 
heavily affected by the economy, and by the past investment decisions of the 
commercial and savings and loan industry. The larger commercial banks, in 
particular, have been hurt by their concentration of international loans, by 
loans to the now-volatile agricultural industry, and by fluctuations and 
uncertainty in real estate. 
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There is no doubt that foreign banks intend to capitalize on 
California 1 S strong consumer market. Japanese banks, in fact, have a market 
strategy that has involved accepting lower profit in the short run to 
establish their market position in the longer run. They pick a market 
niche, sell their product at a low cost, and penetrate the broader market 
over time, as they do in other sectors. Japanese banks are specializing in 
working with state and local governments in industrial revenue bond 
finance. They have also been actively involved in providing stand-by 
letters of credit to back bank obligations of municipal governments. 
The larger context of Japanese banking is the strategic rationale of 
having available in the United States credit capability for those Japanese 
firms that are or will be manufacturing here or warehousing 
inventory--whether they are producers, suppliers or buyers of Japanese 
products. The reason for this stems from the social role played by banks in 
Japan. The 11 Zaibatsu 11 structure of interlocking ownership and industrial 
collaboration among Japanese firms motivates banks to locate abroad so that 
they can provide both credit and related services to their firms as they 
penetrate new markets. Banks such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Sumitomo, 
are all part of this network of Japanese banks and industry. Acquiring 
California banks is important because it enables more effective sales and 
production in California high-technology and consumer product markets. 
While having banks in target country markets is not essential to trade 
and manufacturing, it is convenient. The importance of concentrating U.S. 
deposits in the U.S. headquarters of foreign owned banks is that a deposit 
base enables a foreign business to more easily establish letters of credit 
and IMke trade arrangements. In general, companies like to be close to the 
market they are entering and, once there, tend to use banks that are 
familiar wfth their business and credit needs. Thus, the deposit 
concentration in foreign-owned banks suggests the creation of a U.S. 
platform for business finance in the leading economic communities of the 
California market (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles). 
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The S&l industry has been the most affected by deregulation and the 
larger market shifts. Their traditional portfolio of long-term loans at 
fixed rates and regulatory constraints on interest paid did not permit them 
to become competitive during the period when interest rates rose and clients 
shifted their deposits from passbook savings to accounts bearing higher 
interest. Once they were able to enter new markets, few S&ls could move 
rapidly to compete with banks, or other financial industry service firms. 
Deregulation--nationally and within California--permitted more 
competitive strategies. 
real estate development. 
One attractive strategy for S&Ls was to invest in 
Some real estate developers bought small S&Ls and 
used deposit brokers to find more depositors. The deposits were then used 
to finance real estate development. Unfortunately, several of these 
development-bank S&Ls found their net worth wiped out when one or more 
projects failed. This problem has also hurt other S&ls diversifying into 
the commercial real estate field. 
The need to compete pushed S&Ls to offer higher interest rates and to 
devise new types of loans to offset them, such as the variable rate and 
adjustable interest loan. However, the volatility of interest rates over 
time places an unusual stress on consumers--particularly the negative 
amortization type of loan. As a result, S&Ls are concerned about the 
potential for future loan defaults as well as potential cash shortages if 
interest rates decline significantly. 
Federal regula tors have taken over or ordered new management for 
several California S&ls in the past year. All S&Ls face higher insurance 
premiums for deposits insured by the S&L system. Foreclosures have gone up 
GOO%; reserves are down to $3 per $100 of liabilities and many S&Ls have 
found their net worth cut in half. Profit has dropped 75%. About 20% of 
California S&Ls generate almost 95% of S&l profits. Unless the structure of 
the system changes, high FSLIC insurance costs are likely to continue and to 
be directly passed to consumers. While there is some pressure to return the 
S&L system to its original home loan focus, and away from becoming 11 Second 
class" commercial banks, the issue is not likely to be resolved in the near 
term. California S&Ls, while facing some continuing difficulties in 
competing, are improving their position. 
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lowering accounts receivable (there is no float on debited funds) reducing 
transaction costs (including interbank transfers) and reducing exposure to 
fraud (bad checks are avoided and fraudulent credit cards cannot be used, 
although the problem of stolen cards remains). 
"Smart cards" will be entering the market within the next few years as 
well and may be part of the debit card product made available to consumers. 
Smart cards are credit cards with microprocessors built in. They can store 
information, calculate transactions, and authorize purchases, as well as 
improve credit card security. Smart cards are being test marketed in Europe 
and in some U.S. areas. 
Videotex is a computer-based system for carrying out sales transactions 
that is expected to increase in availability over the next 5 years as more 
TV cable systems offer two-way operation. However, competition between 
satellite dish communications and cable systems may slow this process 
somewhat. Individuals will be able to subscribe to cable connections with 
computerized transaction systems and will be able to review products and 
conclude sales, including paying bills and making related bank 
transactions. Home banking and sales of related financial service products, 
such as insurance in the home will be feasible as a result of this 
technology. Several of the large banks in California are test marketing 
home banking at the present time. Telephone banking is already available in 
most California consumer markets. Simpler than computer home banking, but 
relatively similar, telephqne banking permits consumers to pay bills by 
punching in the numbers on a touch-tone telephone. 
TI1e impact of the increasing range of electronic transactions on 
competitiveness and employment in the California depository institutions 
sector is not known. The number of employees required for traditional 
transactions (e.g., tellers) is likely to diminish. The number of more 
skilled employees required to manage operating systems is likely to 
increase. There is no way to determine how (or if) the long-term growth in 
electronically based marketing (through computers and television) will 
affect employment in telemarketing and customer service. Currently, 
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California commercial banks have more employees than the national 
average because of the extensive statewide branching system, which requires 
headquarters employees not engaged in banking. While California has 6% of 
banking companies it has 12.7% of employees. As a result, California bank 
financial performance and productivity are slightly below the national 
average. Since 1981, the number of employees has been decreasing by about 
5,000 workers annually; the reduction can be expected to continue for at 
1 east one more year and perhaps up to three more years. Bank of America has 
let go over 7,000 workers since 1982 and Crocker has dropped 2,000; other 
large banks have followed. Some of the loss in employees may be at least 
partly offset by hiring for the new financial services banks are offering. 
However, there are no data on how much (or whether) prior layoffs have been 
offset by growth in new financial services. 
A critical issue in commercial banking is how successful they can be in 
shifting existing employees to emerging service areas, such as real estate 
brokerage, securities, insurance, management consulting and data 
processing. Fundamental to maintaining employment is upgrading basic 
reading, writing, and communications skills of employees. This is a serious 
problem at the subsupervisory level. California's banking employees include 
a significant number of Hispanic and Asian workers. An SRI study of three 
banks showed a range of 25% to 72% Hispanic and Asian. 
The causes of low skill levels relate to low salaries, recruitment 
practices (referral), screening and selection processes, lack of incentives, 
and limited tr·aining opportunities. The problem is made ~wrse by 
supervisory difficulties with employees from different cultura 1 
backgrounds. The Bank of America is using the Californid ~orker Employment 
Training program (CWETA) to retrain employees in-house and thus avoid 
1 ayoffs. This is a creative approach to sharing the cost for mai ntai ni ng 
employment {the bank contributes to the state unemployment insurance fund, 
but has rarely discharged employees until recently). However, the overall 
problem is so large as to require far more. A consortium of banks in the 
San Francisco Bay Area is now examining how they can work more effectively 
with community colleges to develop needed curricula and programs for 
retraining and skills upgrading. 
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The number of troubled S&ls in California is increasing. While the 
business was "heaven on earth" in the 1960s and 1970s, S&Ls were 
ill-equipped to deal with the changes in the economy and in regulation that 
came in the 1980s. California's S&Ls have recovered from the dramatic 
collapse of 1981-1982, although there are 5% fewer S&Ls than before. The 
decrease came largely through an ongoing process of merger and acquisition. 
However, the number of firms has increased since 1982, and the number of 
offices has continued to climb. There has been a 300% increase in the 
number of S&L offices since 1970. Neither the decrease in the number of 
California S&Ls nor the increase in the number of offices has reached the 
national ~verage, however. California had 3.9% of the nation's S&Ls in 1970 
and in 1984. 
California • s larger S&Ls have moved aggressively into out-of-state 
aquisitions. Seven California S&Ls had 410 out-of-state branches in 1984. 
Companies such as Home Savings and American Savings have been able to 
acquire selected (troubled) S&Ls in Ohio, Missouri, Florida, Texas, and 
Arizona, avoiding the more insolvent companies that are now plaguing some 
state governments. 
Even when the industry has been struggling, California S&Ls were doing 
better than the national average. This is largely due to the fact that more 
California S&Ls are publicly held, rather than being mutual associations. 
California S&Ls had 23.9% of the nation's gross profits in 1983, below the 
1980 peak of 37.6% but good considering the hard times. Gross profits as a 
percent of assets were 113% of the nation's average in 1983, and have 
usually been 6% to 18% above the national average for the past 15 years. 
Credit unions, while a small part of the depository institutions in 
California, have good potential for expansion because of their employee- and 
association-related market contacts. Credit unions have decreased in number 
and lost 1% of market share nationally over the past decade. Deposits have 
grown to $14.4 billion, which is 13.2% of the national total. Per employee 
assets have been higher than the national average. 
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Mew technologies will help California banks remain competitive, if 
labor costs turnover can be managed. However, banks will have to be 
even more aggressive in new service areas, as well as the traditional ones, 
if they are to n r market share against out-of-state firms. 
Foreign-controlled banks are playing a greater and greater role in the 
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cul es in operating efficiencies may be 
banks to subcontract services out of state to 
gher quality labor. This implies a need for 
continued state involvement with the financial services industry in 
education and retraining initiatives. 
S&l industry nationally and within the state is still undergoing a 
process of adjustment and shakeout to the changing financial services 
market. California's S&ls, overall, are doing better than those in the rest 
of the country. The larger question is the overall viability of the S&L 
business in the United States. Will it have to return to specializing in 
home mortgages or wi 11 S&Ls become second-class commercial banks? These 
issues, layered on top of the generally less sophisticated management style 
of S&ls, wi1l make successful performance increasingly difficult for the 
state's industry. 
Credit unions may be a suprise factor in the financial services 
industry in California. Credit unions affiliated with affluent and 
expanding employment areas (such as the professional segment of Silicon 
Valley) are expanding and have a strong base for competition in consumer 
credit, home improvement loans, and auto loans. They might be expected to 
sh0\'1 some growth, but will still be small relative to the overall financial 
services industry in the state. 
Financing California Enterprise 
The health and adaptiveness of California's financial service industry 
pl a broad and important role in the competitiveness of the rest of the 
state's industry. This role concerns, primarily, the commercial finance 
segment of commercial banking, but it also includes industries not discussed 
earlier, including venture capital finance and investment banking. The 
importance of the ro1e of California's financial services industry is 
described below, followed by a review of innovations in finance where 
banks--as result of deregulation ana roore competitive finance industry 
environment--are likely to play an even greater role in the future. 
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The Expanding Stage 
By the time an industry moves into the expanding stage, it has shown 
early signs of long-term viability and has started to generate revenues. 
Typically, the expanding stage begins with unsustainably rapid rates of 
growth in sales, which later taper off to more moderate rates of long-term 
growth. Expanding industries in the high-growth phase include the software 
segment of the information services industry, aerospace, and tourism. 
Rapid growth shifts a group of high-risk start-up ventures toward 
becoming a large, established, maturing, low-risk industry. At first, the 
expanding industry is supported by second-tier financing from venture 
capital providers, by trade credit, and by finance companies whose close 
monitoring and heavily collateralized loans are well suited to both high 
growth and relatively risky financing. Investment funds and investment 
bankers enter into the expanding stage as well, with private placements to 
selected investors and with initial public offerings of stock. As growth 
becomes more reliable, the industry becomes a mainstream user of capital 
from traditional sources such as banks and money markets. 
The Transforming Stage 
The transforming stage of the industry life-cycle introduces great 
uncertainty into the industry's financial requirements. Markets become 
saturated, competition intensifies, margins become thin, and the industry 
casts about for ways to survive. During this stage, companies follow one of 
three strategies: acceptance of decline and failure; dematuration and 
consolidation into a tighter, more focused industry; or transformation into 
a different industry. 
Very few firms simply roll over and die. The vast majority respond to 
adversity with renewed energy and a burst of resourcefulness. Companies 
that choose to demature continue to serve the same markets but make massive 
changes in their internal structure, stripping away excess capacity, 
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Attitudes--The willingness of investors to place funds depends in 
part on how the MidArnerican region is perceived as a whole, how the 
industry is viewed, and the type of investment. 
A wide variety of capital providers serve California. These include 
intennediary institutions {banks, thrifts, finance companies, insurance 
companies, investment funds}, brokers C'deal makers" of various kinds who 
arrange transactions), and direct investors or lenders (who risk their own 
funds). 
Capital providers concentrate on specific lines of business lending, 
investment, or brokerage. Without exception, however, all providers place 
funds based on their assessment of individual company situations; none \lill 
risk funds solely on the basis of industrywide or regional aggregate 
information. Programs to augment an industry's capital access must, 
therefore, enhance the individual company's ability to manipulate one or 
more of the five components identified above. 
Even today, when most financial services companies are expanding into 
each other's traditional lines of business, each capital provider tends to 
concentrate in certain financial markets according to the risk 
characteristics and the tenure (duration) of their investments and loans. 
Obtaining Capital to Meet California's Needs 
Traditional forms of financing are increasingly inadequate, and 
financial innovations are needed. Fortunately, the U.S. financial community 
is in the most creative and innovative period of its history. The financial 
industry in California has exhibited surprising creativity, and the 
cdpital-hungry industries themselves are becoming increasingly sophisticated 
and innovative. 
Capital dvailability for California can be provided through public and 
private innovations aimed at overcoming barriers to access as described 
below. 
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financial sector. ifornia does provide some of these forms of risk 
r~duction, including loan guarantees. 
Enhancing Return on Investment 
Returns to the investor or lender can be enhanced through revenue 
increases, cost decreases, tax advantages, or approaches that increase the 
certainty (or the volatility) of returns. 
Enhancement of 
c 
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can involve several forms of direct government 
ght include: regulatory reforms in banking laws, 
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return by reducing tax rates on capital gains; and 
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states that permit the use of equity 
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can also enhanced by financial institutions 
or inves practices such as leveraging loans 
participations to other lenders at lower rates, 
on in loans (i.e .• accepting cash or stock 
warrants in return for lower interest and longer terms), and various forms 
of flexible interest rate structures (interest rate swaps, interest rate 
futures, and use of various ceilings, floors, front-end fees, deferred 
income, and performance-linked repayment approaches). 
Improving Channels of Access 
Relationships with financial institutions are often the key to. 
acquiring needed finance. Innovation in access channels is just beginning. 
Industry and government can work with clients to shape financial instruments 
more creatively, mixing different sources and terms to meet client needs. 
In some cases, the government can have a strong role in this area of 
; nnovation. Federa 1 and state government 1 oan programs frequently pro vi de 
partial or complete financing help to leverage private debt. State-
sponsored venture capital funds, financed either by general revenues or by 
bonds, and capital from state employee retirement/pension funds are being 
used to increase the availability of capital in more than 20 states. States 
are increasingly working through privately managed venture funds as well as 
running their own enterprises. However, California has such a strong 
venture capital industry (i.e., a sufficient amount of venture financing 
targeted to investments in the state) that this type of policy may not be 
necessary, at this time. 
Governments are also enabling and sponsoring new financial 
intermediaries, such as development finance companies, that take public and 
private capital and leverage the funds by making mixed debt and equity 
placements. Portions of these investments are often guaranteed and resold 
(through the SBA program, for example). California was the first state to 
enable formation of Business Industrial Development Companies (BIDCOs) to 
perform this function. California legislation has served as a general model 
for other states. 
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Improved channels of access can help California firms at all 
developmental stages. Government loans and mixed public-private funding are 
particularly attractive for dematuring industries, such as agriculture, 
indus al inery, and smaller chemical producers. State or private 
venture funds are essential increasing the supply of capital for 
start-ups in new industries such as software and biotechnology. However, 
venture leveraged buyouts are also essential to financing major 
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as nancial counseling. loan preparation, investment 
packaging and brokering, and initial stock issue underwriting. California 
is active in some phases of business loan preparation. In some instances 
government may find that "incubators .. that provide a continuum of business 
services and information for start-up firms can reduce financial needs and 
improve survival rates in emerging industries. Venture finance companies 
are increasingly in the "incubation" business, helping first to finance new 
firms with venture capital and then to nurture them through their early 
development. Technology centers, sponsored by states, universities, and 
sometimes businesses alone, are becoming a popular means of helping 
companies gain access to information on technology and markets. 
Information on capital markets is always important, but it is most 
critical to emerging California enterprises that are uncertain what 
financial sources are appr.opriate for them. For emerging industries--both 
those just starting out and those passing into the first- or second-tier 
venture financing stage--finding both interested investors and help in 
business planning is very important. This is true even for some firms with 
venture financing, such as new participants in software, biotechnology, 
robotics, and health services. Such firms have often given up significant 
equity to gain initial financing and, as a result, have difficulty in 
finding sources for their next level of debt or equity. 
Information, however, can be equally critical to mature, midsized 
industries that require levels of capital beyond what their traditional 
lenders can provide. Assistance in finding investors--for equity 
investments or mergers and acquisitions--might be critical to completing the 
process of transformation in industries such as industrial machinery or 
specialty chemicals. 
Mobilizing Capital Markets 
The capital needed to finance the continuing transformation of the 
California economy is available in the global capital market. The problem 
is mobilizing both suppliers and users of capital to consider new approaches 
to meeting the finance needs. 
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In part, the successful transformation of the banking and securities 
industries into an integrated financial services sector (as discussed 
earlier) 11 be measured by their response to changing demands for 
capital. However, the current economic and competitive climate has, at 
least temporarily, made financial institutions far more conscious of risk, 
profit margins, and short-term returns on investment. As a result, despite 
growing competition in financial services and increasing pressures to 
transform, the industry may not take the initiative in exploring alternative 
approaches to nancing industrial development. The innovative financial 
techniques described in this report constitute a menu of options that can be 
used, under the right circumstances, to improve capital access. There is 
clearly a basis for collaboration among the public sector, private industry, 
and the financial community to encourage use of these approaches, but the 
shared interests of industry, federal and state governments, and the capital 
markets need to be better articulated. 
State Role in California Industry Finance 
Regu1 tools targeted investments are potent public-sector 
tools increasing access to capital. Despite recent federal regulatory 
changes as the Germain Act), U.S. commercial banks still 
rate laws deter them from using new approaches in lending to 
inves ng in iness. In Japan, on the other hand, banks and 
pl a cri supportive role in industry as partners in 
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to industries in need of assistance. In these programs, funds from the 
state genera 1 
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At t, such programs can provide only limited resources 
to industries in need of assistance. 
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In recent years, states have started to recognize that they can respond 
directly to the constraints on capital markets by helping lenders and 
investors to reduce risks, increase return, improve channels of access, 
enhance information, and change investor attitudes toward investment. 
Accordingly, they are addressing capital market constraints by redefining 
their financial industry regulatory policies and industry finance programs. 
This appears to the most appropriate form for California as well. 
States that make direct subsidies are concentrating their subsidies 
more often on R&D tax credits and new capital tax credits and on incentives 
related to job generation by new firms. Clearly, subsidies of bank lending, 
through linked-deposits programs, for example, are useful in targeting 
subsidies to specific industries that are in particular difficulty. But 
these approaches, in the end, are only temporary measures that must be 
complemented by larger reforms in industry finance. 
Subsidies of industry cannot replace improving the efficiency of the 
capital market. Increased efficiency, ultimately, is a consequence of 
providing better rMrket information, carefully modified financial industry 
regulations (interstate banking), creation of new financial instruments, and 
strategic incentives of public funds such as pension investments. Achieving 
this will require increased collaboration among industry, government, and 
capital markets. While California is ahead of most states in terms of 
introduction of innovations in regulation, productive changes are still 
needed and can be accomplished only if all three sectors have a shared 
agenda. 
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Table 27 
SUI~t-1ARY OF ACTIONS NEEDED FOR KEY CALIFORNIA INDUSTRIES 
Element 
Value added production Worker productivity Expanded markets 
Industry 
Agriculture Value added products New management skills FOR£IGN MARKETS 
High tech PROCESS TECHNOLOGY Engineering skills New markets 
Manufacturing 
Basic 
r1anufacturi ng 
Aerospace 
Finance 
FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING Skills retraining 
AND UESIGN 
Process technology Engineering skills 
Automation technology Skills retraining 
Import 
substitution 
COMf4ERCIAL 
MARKETS 
PACIFIC BASIN 
i~AHKET$ 
Note: Capital letters indicate priority actions for each industry. 
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Advanced manufacturing 
e automation to short 
nes and robots that can be 
new tasks. (Over 75% of all 
are produced in batches of 50 or 
11 be computer-integrated 
1 in computers, artificial 
intelligence, and software is in a prime position to become a center for the 
development of increasingly sophisticated CIM. (An example of this 
potential is the recent joint venture between Measurex, a $160 million 
Silicon Valley software firm, and Ford r~otor Company to deveiop a software 
system to link Ford's current "islands of automation .. on the factory floor.) 
The leadership in moving toward new horizons in advanced manufacturing 
must clearly reside with the private sector. Business must make the 
investments and strategic decisions necessary to develop and adopt new 
manufacturing process technologies. To capture the real opportunity in 
flexible manufacturing and computer-integrated manufacturing systems, 
California will need to move aggressively because others have targeted this 
same opportunity; including Japan and states of the industrial f4idwest 
(e.g., Michigan). 
The state government can make critical investments to help stimulate 
this development building on its current strengths through the state's 
universities. Working in partnership with the private sector, the state 
can help build the necessary technology infrastructure or capacity that can 
help the private sector move ahead in this area. California has the 
opportunity to draw on its existing strengths in its universities and 
federal laboratories in making manufacturing technology more accessible to 
industry. Possible steps include the following: 
Create Centers for r•1anufacturin Com etitiveness as 
umverslty 1n ustry consort1um partnersh1ps to provide applied 
technology for industries in the development and adoption of new 
manufacturing/process technologies. Models of jointly funded 
technology centers have already been developed with the University 
of California in areas of microelectronics (MICRO at UC Berkeley) 
and magnetic tape· (UC San Diego}. New emphasis is needed in the 
applications of technology to advanced manufacturing. For example, 
the Ben Franklin Partnership Program in Pennsylvania provides state 
matching grants for applied technology centers at state universities 
focused on such areas as robotics and computer aided design and 
manufacturing. Participating firms in private industry share in the 
funding and determine what app 1 i ed research is conducted. 
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firms. The state's role is to act primarily as a catalyst to help the 
private sector gain access to the most useful research and applications in 
advanced technology. Clearly, the process of adopting new manufacturing 
technologies must be industry-driven, based on the needs of individual firms 
to become more competitive. The state can, however, play an important role 
in helping firms gain access to what is available from public universities 
and federal facilities and in encouraging innovative joint action in this 
area. 
Enhancing Worker Productivity 
In addition to new technologies, the key to increasing manufacturing 
competitiveness is enhancing worker productivity and flexibility. In fact, 
investments in increasing flexibility in manufacturing must be complemented 
by investment in increasing skills and flexibility in the work force. 
Workers need new skills to operate and maintain new-techno1ogy equipment. 
The growth of new industries and the decline of older industries will 
require worker adaptability and retraining. Worker motivation and 
commitment will remain the cornerstone of productivity and thus efforts will 
be needed to ensure increased participation in the workplace. Therefore, an 
equal commitment to investments in human resources will be required to match 
the required investment in new technologies. 
California industry faces a choice in how to compete based on its human 
resources. One approach is to focus on cutting human resource cost, the 
other approach is to increase human resource quality. Given the lower wage 
rates of our foreign competitors, competing through the the first approach 
will result in the loss of jobs and reduction in our standard of living. To 
compete and maintain our standard of living, California must focus on human 
resource quality, not simply cost. This requires investing in worker 
skills, (including communication, literacy, and numeracy skills) retraining 
employees for more complex tasks, and adopting new technologies in a way 
that allows workers to work creatively with machines to improve products and 
manufacturing processes. 
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Labor market matching--As rapid changes in industry and technologies 
create more structural employment change, more attention must be 
given to mechanisms that increase the efficiency of labor market 
matching. Both government and business need to invest in local 
labor market information sharing that will enhance the mobility of 
the workforce. Government employment programs, including the state 
employment service, need to provide assistance to workers in gaining job search skills. Efforts to create new labor market matching 
efforts in the Bay Area and Los Angeles need to be encouraged by the 
state as an important way to address a competitiveness issue. 
Employee incentives--Innovative management must place a strong 
emphasis on creating employee incentives for high quality 
performance and commitment. These include encouraging the adoption 
by the private sector of employment security policies that promote 
growing opportunity for employees to continue in employment in a 
firm, if they are willing to accept changes of assignment. 
Incentive stock options and employee stock ownership plans should be 
encouraged to reward individual employees and strengthen the link 
between pay and performance. 
Linking investments in. new manufacturing technologies and human resources 
skills is critical for moving toward higher-value-added production. These 
activities need to be planned in partnership with the private sector as part 
of California's overall strategic plan for the future. 
Expanding Markets 
Creating the capacity to produce more competitively is half the 
battle. Aggressively marketing value-added products is also required. 
Agriculture in California provides the important lessons--it is not enough 
to focus on production, it is also critical to promote new markets. 
Expanding trade is especially important for agriculture, aerospace, and high 
technology manufacturing. While the value of the dollar, trade practices, 
and federal policy clearly determine the overall shape of export markets 
(and California should be aggressive in making sure that its views on these 
issues are well known in Washington), much can be done at the state level to 
promote new markets and find profitable niches. At the same time, because 
California itself has become a major market that is served by industries 
outside the state, import substitution is an important stategy for 
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Lobbyinf Washington on trade issues--The state interest in trade, 
especia ly with the rising Pacific Basin markets, is too critical to 
the state•s economy to be left to Washington alone. California must 
make its presence known in Congress and in the Executive Branch to 
promote its i tin trade. This might be accomplished by 
creating a special California Trade Office in Washington 
Ex~ort promotion through state-sponsored trade missions, trade 
of ices in key foreign countries, and finance assistance for medium 
and small businesses. While large firms may not need much 
state-level help, smaller firms can profit by assistance from the 
state--helping to provide infonnation, making contacts, and 
providing some financial help. A major focus of export promotion 
should be California's comparative advantage as the "Gateway to the 
Pacific " targeting efforts toward the growing Pacific Basin 
markets. While California has become more active in this area 
through its new export financing legislation, activities of the 
World Trade Commission, and the California Economic Development 
Corporation 1 s Pacific Basin Task Force, much more can be done to 
develop focused state effort in this area. Opportunities may exist 
to join with some other Western states to jointly market products in 
the Pacific Basin. 
Imeort substitution through focused state efforts on a regional 
basis. Regional economic clusters create demands for support 
iers that are often met by firms outside the 
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Californi . It addresses major factors influencing California's 
competitive are thin the control of California itself and 
1 
can be built through a partnership between the public and private sector. 
;.Joving forward on this strategy requires several initial steps: 
Shared vision--Leaders in industries facing competitive threats and 
concerned state government leaders need to join together in 
formulating a shared vision of promoting competitiveness. Some 
possible elements for that shared vision have been suggested in this 
report. 
Action program--Using that shared v1s1on as a base, leaders need to 
develop a specific action program that includes actions to be taken 
by both the private and public sectors. This action program should 
be developed through discussion and negotiations that include 
1 eaders from each sector. · 
com etitiveness monitorin --Better mechanisms are needed to 
mon1tor tren s 1n compet1t1veness on an ongoing basis and assess 
results of new initiatives. 
State capacity in competitiveness--The legislature should take 
advantage of existing committees with jurisdiction over key areas 
related to competitiveness or, if necessary, consider creating one 
or more new committees to hold hearings, review proposals, and 
monitor developments in this area. Such committees could also 
analyze key legislation from the standpoint of its expected impact 
on competitiveness. The Administration should focus the activities 
of state agencies on this issue and assess the impact of all state 
actions in the area of competitiveness. 
In summary, major attention should be focused on competitiveness as an 
issue critical to the future of the state; private leaders should be 
involved in the development of a major program in this area; and, where 
necessary, new public and private institutions should be established to give 
this issue the visibility that it deserves. 
i~ost urgently, steps need to be take immediately to build a consensus 
among leaders from key industries facing competitive threats and state 
government leaders concerning the need for action. Consensus development 
should be stimulated through discussions across the state, focusing on what 
each sector can do to help promote manufacturing innovation, worker 
productivity, and expanding markets. Building a coalition for 
competitiveness in California that involves leaders from major industries is 
essential for moving ahead in this critical area. 
164 
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS ROUNDTABLE 
. Bill Allewalt 
i dent Emeritus 
Tri-Valley Growers 
Mr. Michael Borrus 
Co-Director 
SRI International 
September 19, 1985 
Participants 
Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy 
Mr. Harold Edmundsen 
Vice President, Manufacturing 
Hewlett-Packard 
Ms. Sue Greenwood 
Uirector of Government Affairs 
Communication Workers Union 
,James 
utive cer 
Argonaut I rmati on Systems 
Officer 
San Diego 
Chairman, Industrial 
Competitiveness Task Force 
, Advanced Micro Devices 
Research Cooperative 
cer 
ve Director 
lifornia Commission on Industrial Innovation 
165 
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS TASK FORCE 
Mr. C. Richard Allen 
Chief Executive Officer 
Pacific Triangle Management Corporation 
Mr. Richard Atkinson 
Chancellor 
University of California at San Diego 
Mr. Elwood Buffa 
Professor of Management Strategy and Policy 
UCLA Graduate School of Management 
Mr. Gary Burke 
Manager 
Government Relations 
IBM 
Mr. Don Carlson 
Chairman of the Board 
Consolidated Capital 
Mr. Stephen Cohen 
BRIE 
Instit~te for International Studies 
University of California at Berkeley 
Mr. Bob Curry 
Director of Research 
California State University, Sacramento 
Mr. Zika Djokovich 
President 
Mission Viejo Lighting 
Ms. Barbara Eiland McCallum 
Secretary and Legislative Advocate 
California Federaion of Business and Professional Women 
Mr. John Freidenrich 
Administrative Partner 
Bay Partners 
Ms. Maureen Frisch 
Manager, Government Affairs 
TRW 
Mr. Nathan Gardels 
Executive Director 
Institute for National Strategy 166 
Mr. Marvin L. Gal r 
President 
1ifornia Institute of Technology 
Mr. loni Hancock 
Executive Director 
Shalan Foundation 
Mr. Henry Hwang 
Chai nnan 
Far East National Bank 
Mr. Ruben Jauregi 
Vice President 
latin Business Association 
Mr. Cliff Jernigan 
Director, Government Affairs 
Advanced Micro Devices 
Mr. Camilla Koco1 
Administrative Consultant 
Division of Adult and Occupational Education 
Los Angeles Unified School District 
Mr. Todd La Porte 
Associate Director 
Institute of Governmental Studies 
University of California at Berkeley 
linsteadt 
Governmental Liaison 
s Center 
ames nn 
V ce-President Corporate Affairs and Administration 
Cali rnia First Bank 
McJunkin 
ve Director 
rt of Long Beach 
Mr. Regis McKenna 
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer 
Regis McKenna, Inc. 
f"1i gnano 
ve Director 
World Trade Commission 
State of California 
Steven M. Panzer, Ph.D. 
Executive Director 
Southern California Technology Executive Network 
167 
Mr. Jim Quillin 
Executive Secretary-Treasurer 
California Conference of Machinists 
Mr. Clark Randt, Jr. 
Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe 
Mr. Michael Ray 
President 
T. Ray Construction 
Or. Charles Runne11 s, Jr. 
Chancellor 
Pepperdine University 
Or. Adolph Sanchez 
Oi rector 
MTT Systems Group 
Mr. Paul Slawson 
President 
Getz Corporation 
Mr. Roger Smith 
Chief Executive Officer 
Silicon Valley Bank 
Mr. Earl Spencer 
General Electric Company 
Ms. Linda Tsao Yang 
Linda Tsao Yang & Associates 
r~r. Joel Yudken 
Program Oi rector 
Center for Economic Conversion 
